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  viii Executive Summary 
 
1.  Introduction 
The enterprise of agriculture is subject to great many uncertainties.   Yet more people in 
India earn their livelihood from this sector than from all other sectors put together.   
This includes large number of the poor who have little means of coping with adversities.   
Understanding agricultural risks and the ways of managing it is therefore a topic that 
deserves serious attention and research.   On the basis of existing literature, this study 
documents the status of our knowledge on risks of agriculture and their management.   
Inspite of its manifest importance, risk management in agriculture is an under-
researched topic relative to traditional concerns such as land tenure, technology 
adoption and food policy.    
  
2.  Principal Risks 
Chapter 2 discusses the evidence on the nature, type and magnitude of agricultural 
risks.  There are very few studies that give us such information because the 
measurement of risk requires (a) observations over many time periods, i.e., time-series 
data and also requires (b) observations at the lowest unit, i.e., the farm.   In most 
cases, therefore, the evidence is fragmented and indirect.   
  Production and price (or market) risks are two major risks that confront farmers.  
These risks could either be systemic or covariate (i.e., they are common to large groups 
of producers) or they could be individual-specific or idiosyncratic.  The distinction is 
important because risk pooling and insurance arrangements (whether formal or 
informal) are more likely to offer protection against idiosyncratic risks rather than 
systemic risks.    
The diversity of climate, growing conditions and market structures means that 
there is no typical risk environment for a farmer.   In the drylands without access to 
assured irrigation, rainfall is a dominant production risk.   There are, however, many 
attributes of rainfall – the relevance of the onset date of monsoon and the distribution of 
rainfall through the season varies according to crop and soil type.   The spatial spread of 
rainfall varies too.   As a result, rainfall risk could be both covariate (i.e., a systemic risk) 
and individual specific depending on the year and the region.   Similar is the case with 
pests and disease.   Local pest and disease infestations depend on many factors 
  1 including the crop variety, weather, the use of pesticides and other crop practices.   
Beyond a threshold level, the infestation can quickly reach epidemic proportions 
affecting large areas.   Unlike rainfall risks, the humid and irrigated regions have no 
special advantage with respect to pest and disease attacks.    
  As the demand for agricultural products is inelastic, supply shocks are magnified 
in price variations.   Besides production risks, supply shifts are also because of variability 
in planned supply, i.e., area planted to a particular crop.   Variability in planned supply 
comes about because of errors in forecasting prices.   Often, the biases in these errors 
are systematic as forecasts are determined by past prices.   As a result, prices and 
planned supply can oscillate creating endogenous variability.   Such uncertainty is often 
seen in seasonal price movements as well.   The importance of price risk would depend 
on the extent of exposure to market forces as well as existing market institutions.   
International trade can increase or decrease price variability.    
   
3.  Risk Management at the Farm Household Level  
Chapter 3 discusses farmer strategies to combat risk.   This chapter as well as the next 
relies heavily on the findings from ICRISAT village studies. Uncertainties in income 
within agriculture can arise from several sources and a farm household adopts different 
strategies to mitigate this risk, and smooth income and consumption.  A distinction is 
usually made between risk reducing strategies that the farmer adopts ex-ante to lower 
risk and risk roping strategies that the farmer adopts ex-post.    
There are essentially six ex post ways to compensate for shortfalls in farm 
income: They can sell stored produce, liquidate assets, borrow for consumption, receive 
transfers from relatives, change jobs and/or increase their labour market participation 
and migrate in search of work.  In their choices, farm households will try to protect their 
assets so as to minimize the adverse impact on their future livelihoods.  If a risk averse 
household is not able to achieve an entirely smooth consumption path through ex post 
mechanisms such as these, it has an incentive to devote resources in an effort to secure 
a more stable income stream.  Households might farm a diversified portfolio of 
agricultural activities, adopt technologies, such as inter-cropping or drought- resistant 
crops, and contractual arrangements such as sharecropping that reduce the variance of 
income, or diversify their activities through migration or local non-agricultural 
  2 employment.  Any of these ex ante actions might be costly, so that the households 
would be sacrificing income, on average, in order to assure a less risky stream of 
income.    
 
4.  Risk Management at the Community Level 
In addition to the mechanisms at the level of the farm household, the need to cope with 
risk can also affect community interactions and social customs.  Gift-based exchange 
that is based on reciprocity and informal borrowing and lending on implicit and flexible 
terms are instances of community level mechanisms that can help farm households to 
cope with adversity.   
In developing countries like India, broad-based formal insurance markets are 
hindered by problems of imperfect information and costly enforcement.  However, these 
problems are limited in small communities.  Villagers tend to know a great deal about 
what their neighbours are up to, and they can fall back on ‘informal’ enforcement 
mechanisms like social sanctions when disputes arise.  The focus of this chapter is 
income smoothing attained through mutual insurance between economic agents.  The 
mechanisms involved might be gifts, transfers or borrowing and lending.  However, all 
mutual insurance schemes share the element of reciprocity.  At the community level, 
exchanges and informal credit are the principal traditional risk coping strategies.   This 
chapter discusses their effectiveness and their limitations that arise because of the 
covariate nature of agricultural risks.    
  Recent research has shown that rural households in India use a wide variety of 
instruments to smooth consumption, some through market and some through informal 
mechanisms.  The ICRISAT studies show that village level risk sharing is able to mitigate 
a large portion of idiosyncratic risk.  Nonetheless, some idiosyncratic risk remains and 
poorer households are considerably more vulnerable than richer households.  
Furthermore, what is disturbing is that risk pooling at the level of village seems weaker 
than by caste and kinship groups.  Recent academic work on incomplete risk sharing has 
focused on the role of imperfect enforcement in explaining the lack of full risk sharing.  
Enforcement problems are key part of the economic environment in the ICRISAT study 
region, but they are insufficient to explain the patterns in the data.  Most important, 
evidence of incomplete risk sharing may result as well from imperfect information, 
  3 heterogeneity in desires and ability to save and borrow, specification error, costly 
contracting, and a host of other factors including discrimination and social isolation.  The 
decline of common property resources, which is an important element of collective 
sustenance arrangements in village India suggests that traditional arrangements for 
mutual insurance are, probably much weaker today than what obtained at the time of 
independence.   
 
5.  Production Risks, Technological Change and Government Programmes  
In chapter 5, we consider how production risks have been transformed by 
developments in the agricultural economy in the post-independence period.  The first 
part of this chapter considers the impact of technological change on production risks.  
The second part of this chapter considers the government response to production risks 
in the form of crop insurance schemes.   
In technology, the momentous event was the introduction of improved seeds in 
the mid-1960s that marked the “green revolution”.  Since then, agricultural growth in 
India has been sustained by technological change.  Since the 1960s, the Indian 
agricultural research system has released many improved varieties some of which have 
been widely adopted by farmers.  The displacement of traditional varieties by improved 
varieties has changed production practices especially in terms of greater use of nutrients 
and pesticides.  The impact of improved varieties on production risks has been 
controversial.  At issue is the susceptibility of improved varieties, relative to traditional 
varieties, to moisture stress and pests.  Improved varieties do well in assured rainfed or 
irrigated environments.  As they are fertilizer responsive, vegetative growth is greater 
with improved varieties that in turn might encourage more pest attacks.  Does that 
mean, however, that improved varieties are riskier than traditional varieties? From a 
review of research there is little conclusive evidence to suggest that these have 
increased the riskiness of production.  On the other hand, the adoption of these 
technologies does carry some long-term risks in terms of soil depletion and genetic 
uniformity.  The chapter also considered the findings on the impact of new technologies 
on aggregate instability.  It was seen that were no direct implications of the rise in 
aggregate instability for farm-level production. 
  4 On the policy front, the government addresses production risks through crop 
insurance programs.  While recent policy changes have enhanced the relevance of crop 
insurance as a risk management device, the program is still small in relation to its 
potential.  Further, the program is not yet on a sound actuarial footing and requires 
considerable government subsidies.  This factor may well hamper its rapid expansion in 
the future. 
 
6.  Market Risks, Government Interventions and Futures Markets 
In chapter 6, we review the principal developments that have impacted on market risks.  
The most important development in the agricultural economy to have an impact on 
market risks have been price support programmes.  Price supports have been the 
principal means by which Indian farmers have received some protection against market 
risks.  The price support policy has its limitations as well.  Firstly, for crops other than 
rice and wheat, price support programmes have been limited or non-existent.  Secondly, 
for the crops that are supported, it has been difficult to balance consumer and producer 
interests.  In some of these crops, the support prices have been consistently fixed 
higher than the counter-factual market price.  As a result, stocks with the government 
tend to increase.  As these policies are not sustainable indefinitely, farmers face a policy 
risk depending on the way stocks are reduced.   
There are also private mechanisms that can potentially help farmers to cope with 
private risks.  In specialty crops and vegetables, contract farming is gaining ground as a 
mechanism by which private processors obtain supplies from farmers.  This system 
takes its appeal among growers because of the price insurance that it offers.  These 
crops are characterized by substantial market risks and contracting allows the transfer of 
these market risks from the farmer to the processor.  It has been found that price 
stability is a major benefit of contract farming for producers.   
A much older institution is the futures market that can provide insurance against 
price volatility.  Futures trading is a market-based institution for trading price risks.  
Theoretically, it allows farmers to hedge against market risks.  However, transactions 
costs is a formidable barrier to the participation of farmers in futures markets.  Further, 
futures markets in India suffer from a lack of liquidity.  Their performance in insuring 
spot prices is also suspect because the basis risk from futures trading is high relative to 
  5 spot price risk.  At the moment, therefore, futures contracting is not a useful risk 
management tool for producers.   
 
7.  Sources 
The paper is largely drawn from the literature.   In keeping with the objectives of 
this study, we focus entirely on India although there are occasional references to other 
developing countries.  Within the literature on agricultural risk management in India, we 
exclude papers that are exclusively modelling contributions.   Clearly, progress in 
modelling is essential for better design of risk management programs and policies.   
However, unless the paper throws light on either existing risks, risk management 
practices or policy issues, the subject is not appropriate for this study.  The study also 
excludes from its ambit prescriptions for better policies.   
 
  6 Chapter 1:  Introduction to Study 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The enterprise of agriculture is subject to great many uncertainties.   Yet more people in 
India earn their livelihood from this sector than from all other sectors put together.   In 
rural India, households that depend on income from agriculture (either self-employed or 
as agricultural labour) accounted for nearly 70% of population (estimates from survey of 
consumption expenditures, NSS, 1999/00).  This includes large number of the poor who 
have little means of coping with adversities.   Poor households that were self-employed 
in agriculture account for 28% of all rural poverty while poor households that are 
primarily dependent on agricultural labour account for 47% of all rural poverty.
1  Thus, 
75% of all rural poor are in households that are dependent on agriculture, in one way or 
the other. The same survey shows that 77% of all poverty is rural. Thus 58% of all poor 
are in households that are dependent on agricultural income in rural areas.   
Understanding agricultural risks and the ways of managing it is therefore a topic 
that deserves serious attention and research.   On the basis of existing literature, this 
study documents the status of our knowledge on risks of agriculture and their 
management.   Inspite of its manifest importance, risk management in agriculture is an 
under-researched topic relative to traditional concerns such as land tenure, technology 
adoption and food policy.   Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
of its kind in India.    
The goals of this study are  
(a) to document the nature, type and magnitude of risks  
(b) to describe the alternative ways in which agricultural producers manage risk  
(c) to describe community responses to risk including traditional practices of exchange 
and credit  
(d) to describe the impact of government programmes and policies on producer risk 
(e) to describe developments in the agricultural economy that have had an impact on 
producer risk.   
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on objectives (a), (b) and (c).  Goals (d) and (e) are 
pursued in chapters 5 and 6.  Chapter 5 deals with policies and agricultural 
developments that have affected production risk.  Chapter 6 considers the impacts of 
  7 the same on price or market risks.  The following is a brief guide to the contents of each 
of these chapters.    
 
1.2  Principal Risks 
This chapter discusses the evidence on the type and magnitude of risks.   The chapter is 
organized around production risks and price or market risks.  Because of the paucity of 
risk studies at the farm level, we consider the sources of production risk in weather and 
in pests and diseases.  In price risks, we show how exogenous and endogenous factors 
play a role in price variability.   
 
1.3  Risk Management at Farmers’ Level 
This chapter discusses farmer strategies to combat risk.   This chapter as well as the 
next rely heavily on the findings from ICRISAT village studies.  A distinction is usually 
made between risk reducing strategies that the farmer adopts ex-ante to lower risk and 
risk coping strategies that the farmer adopts ex-post.   Risk reducing strategies include 
crop diversification, intercropping, farm fragmentation and diversification into non-farm 
sources of income.   Risk –reducing strategies can be effective in many production and 
market related risks but they are typically costly for those farmers who have to forego 
their most profitable alternatives.   Risk coping strategies are relevant for dealing with 
catastrophic income losses, once they occur.   Under risk coping strategies, farmer may 
rely on new credit, the sale of assets, temporary off-farm  employment.   Other 
strategies might involve contractual relations in land and labour.   For instance, 
sharecropping distributes production risks while contracting with traders and merchants 
for credit and marketing is another way of coping with market risks.   Similarly, 
interlocked contracts are another mechanism which re-distributes risk between the 
contracting parties.    
 
1.4  Risk Management at Community Level 
At the community level, exchanges and informal credit are the principal traditional risk 
coping strategies.   This section will discuss their effectiveness and their limitations that 
arises because of the covariate nature of agricultural risks.    
 
  8 1.5.   Production Risks, Technological Change and Crop Insurance 
The green revolution and the subsequent developments that have led to improved 
varieties has been a major factor in the transformation of Indian agriculture.  The first 
part of this chapter considers the impact of technological change on production risks.  
The second part of this chapter considers the government response to production risks 
in the form of crop insurance programs.  
 
1.6  Market Risks, Government Interventions and Futures Markets 
The most important development in the agricultural economy to have an impact on 
market risks was price support programmes.  This chapter considers market intervention 
operations and their impact on producer risk.  The chapter also considers a newer 
development in the private sector, which is the system of contract farming.  This system  
takes its appeal among growers because of the price insurance that it offers.  Another 
private sector solution to price instability is futures markets.  The chapter winds up with 
a discussion about the value of futures markets in India as a risk management tool.   
 
1.7   Sources 
This paper on risk management is a part of the larger study conceived by the 
Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India 
called “State of the Indian Farmer – A Millennium Study”.  The guidelines that have been 
provided to the authors of the individual components of the millennium study seek to 
define their scope and content.  According to them, the millennium study “seeks to 
record the impact of the transformation induced by public policy, investments and 
technological change on the farmers’ access to resources and income as well as the 
well-being of the farm households at the end of five decades of planned economic 
development.”  Thus  it is expected that the papers “give a historical perspective of 
developments, changes in policies and programmes and their impact on professional 
and economic environment of the farmer………The papers are in the nature of 
comprehensive reviews in which the authors are expected to paint an objective and 
unbiased image of developments in agriculture during the last five decades keeping in 
view the farmers’ perspective or farmer at focus….   Policy prescriptions are to be 
avoided.” 
  9 In keeping with the objectives of this study, we focus entirely on India although 
there are occasional references to other developing countries.  For recent surveys on 
agricultural risk management in the developed countries, see OECD, 2000 and European 
Commission, 2001.  Within the literature on agricultural risk management in India, we 
exclude papers that are exclusively modelling contributions.   Clearly, progress in 
modelling is essential for better design of risk management programs and policies.   
However, unless the paper throws light on either existing risks, risk management 
practices or policy issues, the subject is not appropriate for this study.   The study also 
excludes from its ambit prescriptions for better policies.   
  We also note two limitations of this study.  First, because of the absence of 
relevant literature, this study is unable to provide a systematic chronology of 
developments in agricultural risk management.  This lacuna is addressed to some extent 
by our description and analysis of the impacts on the farmer’s risk environment due to 
major changes in the agricultural economy (in chapters 5 and 6).  Second, as 
documented in Chapter 2, paucity of information at farm level has meant that the goal 
of viewing risk from the perspective of farmer is difficult to achieve by a direct 
description of the farmer’s risk environment.  To circumvent this problem, this study 
supplements the limited number of farm-level studies by information assembled from 
diverse sources on farm-level risk factors.   
 
 
  10 Chapter 2:  Principal Risks 
 
2.1  The Risk Environment: Conceptual Considerations  
At a descriptive level, the income risks borne by producers can be classified into three 
kinds: production risks, price risks and input risks.   Production or yield risks arise 
because of two principal factors.   Random uncontrolled inputs (e.g., moisture, 
temperatures) due to weather is the first factor.   Pests and diseases constitute the 
second factor.   Risks from variable prices is the second kind of risk.   Because of 
substantial production lags in agriculture, production decisions are made far in advance 
of the date when output is realized.   As a result, farmers need to forecast the prices 
that will prevail at the time of sale.   The loss to farmers occur when realized prices are 
lower than the expected price.   Although production risks have consequences for price 
risks, the latter is not just because of production risks alone.   Prices can vary also 
because of demand shocks as well as instability in expectations formation.   Finally, 
there are input risks that occur when either there is a shortage of inputs or when their 
prices vary.    Besides these agricultural risks, farm households are also subject to non-
agricultural risks such as illness and disease.   Although analysis of such risks is beyond 
the scope of this study, there is sometimes significant overlap between the mechanisms 
that farmers use to cope against agricultural and non-agricultural risks.   Figure 2.1 
summarises our discussion about the schematic classification of risks.    
From an analytical point of view, a very important distinction is between risks 
that affect and are common to all farm households (such as possibly price and weather 
shocks) and risks that are specific to a particular farmer such as possibly a pest or 
disease.   The former risks are called systemic risks or covariate risks while the latter are 
called idiosyncratic risks.   The distinction is important because economic theory predicts 
that risk pooling and insurance arrangements (whether formal or informal) are more 
likely to offer protection against idiosyncratic risks rather than systemic risks.    
Another distinction that is worth making is between risk and variability.   Too 
often variability is used interchangeably with risk.  However, they are not the same 
because variability does not always imply risk although the reverse is true.   To 
understand this, consider for instance price risk.  It is well known that agricultural prices 
vary from month to month and year to year.  However, if the variation is predictable, 
  11 farmers would face no price risk.  Thus, for instance, even if output price in year 2002 is 
different from that in year 2001, output prices are not risky if at the time of planting, the 
farmer knows for certain the output price at time of sale.   The farmer would then pick 
an appropriate production plan.   For variability to translate into risk, it must be that 
when production decisions are made, the producer does not know or does not forecast 
the relevant variable accurately.    
 
2.2 The Risk Environment: Magnitudes 
Information about the magnitude of risks at the farm-level is meager.  The difficulty is 
principally of data.   The measurement of risk requires (a) observations over many time 
periods, i.e., time-series data and also requires (b) observations at the lowest unit, i.e., 
the farm.   Thus we need a combination of time series and farm-level cross-section data, 
which in current econometric parlance would be known as farm level panel data.    
The first requirement is evident as variability in output, prices and farm returns 
cannot be ascertained from observations at one point.   The second requirement is a 
little subtler.   Time-series data on relevant variables such as output, prices or even farm 
returns is relatively easy to obtain for the country as a whole or for a state as a whole.   
With a little more difficulty, such data can also be obtained at the level of a district for 
most crops.   However, such aggregate data do not accurately convey the magnitude of 
risks facing a producer as aggregation inevitably results in dampening variability.    
 
2.3  Relative Importance of Production and Price Risks 
Input risks have not traditionally received much attention.   Although timely availability 
of inputs is sometimes an issue especially with inputs supplied by the public sector such 
as fertilizers and seeds, input risks are in most circumstances not important because 
production decisions are usually made after the variability in input use and prices is 
resolved.    
  Barah and Binswanger (1982) considered the relative importance of production 
and price risks in crop income risk.
2  They used time series data (1956/57 to 1974/75) 
from 91 districts covering Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.   
In terms of agro-climatic regions, these districts spanned three zones: (1) the 
unirrigated semi-arid tropics with less than 25% of gross cropped area irrigated, (2) the 
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than 25% of gross cropped area irrigated and (3) the humid tropics with annual rainfall 
exceeding 1500 mm.   Although this study used district level yield data and not farm 
level yield data, this study is still worth reporting because it is the only one of its kind.    
  Barah and Binswanger decomposed gross revenue variability into price, yield and 
price-yield interaction components.   If p is price, q is yield and R is gross revenue, then 
 and the variance of gross revenue can be approximated as   qp R =
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where Var is the variance operator, q  and  p  are the means of yield and price 
respectively and Cov is the covariance operator.   Thus, the above identity splits the 
variance of gross revenue into a price component (the first term), an yield component 
(the second term) and a price-yield interaction component (the third term).   The above 
identity can be used to compute the proportion of variability in gross revenue that is due 
to its individual components by rewriting it as  
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where the first term is the contribution of price (CP), the second term is the contribution 
of yield (CY) and the third term is the contribution of the interaction term to revenue 
variability.   By multiplying both sides of the above equation by 100, the contribution of 
the price, yield and interaction terms can be expressed in terms of percentages.   Note 
that if the sum of the price and yield terms exceeds 100%, then it means that the price-
yield interaction is negative because of negative correlation.    
  The results of this study are summarized graphically in Figure 2.2.   The 
horizontal axis plots the price component CP in percentage terms while the vertical axis 
plots the yield component CY in percentage terms for each of the 91 districts in the 
sample.   The line from the origin is the 45-degree line.   If a district lies on this line, 
then it means that the price and yield risk contribute equally to crop revenue risk in this 
district.   If a district lies above and to the left of the 45-degree line, then it means that 
yield risk is more important than price risk for this district.   If a district lies below and to 
the right of the 45-degree line, price risk contributes more to revenue fluctuations than 
yield risk in this district.   The figure also contains a diagonal line intersecting the 100-
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line, the price-yield interaction component is negative while if it lies below the diagonal 
line, the price-yield interaction component is positive.    
  49 of the 59 unirrigated districts in semi-arid tropics are located above and to the 
left of the 45-degree line indicating the greater importance of yield variability in revenue 
risk.   On the other hand, 22 of the 27 irrigated districts in semi-arid tropics and all the 5 
districts in humid tropics lie below and to the right of the 45-degree line indicating the 
greater importance of price variability in revenue risk.   The majority of districts lie 
above the diagonal line connecting the 100-100 points on the price and yield component 
axes.   This means that for most districts, prices and yields are negatively covariate.    
  The negative correlation between prices and yields reduces crop revenue 
fluctuations and provides a natural hedge to farmers.   This suggests the possibility that 
perfect price stabilization could destabilise incomes in some districts.   This would 
happen if the yield component is greater than the sum of price component and the 
price-yield interaction component.   The chances of this are higher larger is the negative 
correlation between price and yield.   Indeed, it is found that when the price term and 
the price-yield interaction term is set to zero (as would be the case with perfect price 
stabilization), the variability of crop revenues increases in 21 districts that lie above the 
100-100 diagonal line.   Of these 17 districts are from the poorer unirrigated districts of 
semi-arid tropics.   The major beneficiaries of reduced price variability are the 
agriculturally richer irrigated districts of the semi-arid tropics and the humid tropical 
districts.   Barah and Binswanger show that stabilizing the yield of the dominant crop in 
each region would be much more effective in stabilizing revenues in the unirrigated 
districts of semi-arid tropics.   Stabilizing price, on the other hand, is an effective 
strategy to reduce revenue risk in the irrigated districts.    
Note that because of the use of district level data, the importance of yield risk is 
likely to be more important at the farm-level than indicated by the Barah and 
Binswanger analysis.   This is clear from an analysis of farmers’ price and yield 
expectations collected from an experiment (Walker and Ryan, 1990).    The experiment 
consisted of offering farmers bets with real payoffs (and not hypothetical payoffs).   
Farmers were given money that they assigned to ten discrete outcomes representing 
yield, price and gross revenue intervals.   Farmers were rewarded the amount placed in 
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yield realization was measured by crop cuts taken in each farmer’s field at harvest.   The 
price realization referred to the peak harvest price in the most frequented market.   Risk 
was defined as the difference between actual and expected values in mean absolute 
percentage errors.    
Thirty farmers from villages in Andhra Pradesh participated in the experiment.   
The villages were in the semi-arid tropics but with access to irrigation.   The farmers’ 
expectations were elicited for paddy and groundnut grown in irrigated conditions.   
Figure 2.3 graphically represents the empirical distribution of mean absolute percentage 
errors across the thirty farmers.   The forecasting errors are much smaller in the price 
distribution with the average errors around 10% for paddy and a little less than 20% for 
groundnuts.   However, the yield forecast errors are larger than 20% for both these 
crops.   Furthermore, the empirical distributions of price are more tightly clustered than 
are the yield distributions indicating that more farmers forecast price correctly than they 
are able to forecast yield.    
 
2.4  The ICRISAT Village Studies 
Inspite of such evidence documenting the importance of yield risks especially in 
harsh dryland production conditions, there is a remarkable paucity of information on the 
magnitude of farm level yield risks.   This is no doubt due to the difficulty that has been 
alluded to earlier – of collecting a time series of farm level yield data for a cross-section 
of growers.   Perhaps the most well known instance of a time series farm level data set 
is the data from the ICRISAT village studies that has spawned many papers especially 
focusing on risk and insurance arrangements in these village economies.   These papers 
have been invaluable in furthering our understanding of how households and 
communities cope with risk and will therefore be repeatedly cited in this study.   For that 
reason, it is convenient to acquaint ourselves with the villages selected in the ICRISAT 
study.    
In the ICRISAT Village Level Studies (VLS), data was gathered from six villages 
located in three contrasting agro-climatic and soil tracts in India’s semi-arid tropics.  
Mahbubnagar in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, Sholapur in the Bombay 
Deccan and Akola in the Vidharba region of Maharashtra were the three regions.   Akola 
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access to irrigation while Sholapur is rainfall-unassured and has no irrigation either.   
Within each region, two villages were selected.   A sample of thirty cultivator households 
and ten landless households was randomly picked in each village.   The households were 
surveyed with respect to their agricultural operations, investments, consumption 
expenditures, and asset transactions during the period 1975/76 to 1984/85.  The 
regions and the villages differ with respect to rainfall, soil, crop and other socio-
economic characteristics.   The names of the villages, regions and their key 
distinguishing features are summarized in Table 2.1 (Walker and Ryan, 1990).      
 
2.5  Determinants of Crop Failure 
Crop failure is an extreme outcome of yield risk when the loss is total.   Using the 
ICRISAT village level data set, Singh and Walker (1984) throw light on the phenomenon 
of crop failure and its determinants in the dryland agriculture of the semi-arid tropics.   
They analyze plot-level data over three cropping years from 1975-76 to 1977-78.   Crop 
failure is identified with a plot that is not harvested.    
While a plot may not be harvested for a number of reasons, the overwhelming 
majority of non-harvested plots were due to crop failure.   Note that because of the low 
opportunity costs of labour, crop failure must be extreme for households not to harvest 
the plot.   Because plots are often intercropped and because plots are sometimes 
harvested for fodder and not for the main product, the definition of crop failure is not 
straightforward.   Singh and Walker consider three possible definitions.   Partial crop 
failure is said to occur when the main product from the dominant crop is not harvested.   
A more stringent criteria is to consider the crop to have failed when no main product is 
harvested.   This is case (a) of a complete crop failure.   The most stringent case is 
when no main product, by product or fodder is harvested.   This is case (b) of a 
complete crop failure.   Table 2.2 displays these definitions and their incidence in the 
ICRISAT study regions.   Note that the incidence of crop failure is the highest for the 
first definition (the least stringent) and least by the third definition (the most stringent).   
For all regions, the average incidence of crop failures varies between 9 to 17% during 
the sample period from 1975/76 to 1977/78.   Over these years, rainfall across the 6 
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three years in each village.     
Crop failure was highest in drought-prone Sholapur and least in rainfall-assured 
Akola.   From a statistical exercise, Singh and Walker find that the risk of crop failure is 
much less for deeper soils (which have greater capacity for water retention) and for 
irrigated plots.   Thus, while a change from a deep to a poor soil increases the 
probability of crop failure by 140%, access to irrigation reduces the probability of crop 
failure by 64%.    
 
2.6  Components of Production Risk: Weather 
As noted earlier, much of output variability is either due to weather or due to pests and 
disease.   Weather is significant in every phase of agricultural activity from the prepatory 
tillage to harvesting and storage.   Weather in its many attributes – rainfall, 
temperature, and sunlight – is an input into the production process.   However, this is 
an input that is not controlled by the farmer.   The farmer can at best employ strategies 
that could maximise the favourable consequences of weather and minimise its adverse 
consequences.   These strategies, however, do not render the weather input 
controllable.   As a result, fluctuations in weather are a major cause of unplanned 
fluctuations in agricultural output and yield.    
  Crop-weather relationships are the subject of research by agro-meteorologists.   
For the purpose of this study, note that our interest lies only in certain aspects of the 
crop-weather relationship.   In particular, we would like to know the role of the weather 
elements in production risk.   This is a much narrower question than the role of weather 
in crop production.   To illustrate the difference, the duration of sunlight is an important 
determinant of crop yields.   However, in India, this component of weather shows little 
variation from year to year and is therefore not regarded as a major determinant of 
variability in crop yields.    
  The effects of weather on crop yields are specific to the crop, soil type, region 
and other factors such as whether the land is irrigated or not.   It is therefore hazardous 
to generalize.   However, if there is a robust finding it is that rainfall is the pre-eminent 
weather variable that causes yield fluctuations.   According to the report of the National 
Commission of Agriculture (Government of India, 1976), rainfall fluctuations could be 
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to discover what parameter of rainfall is critical for growth of a particular crop.   In the 
case of rice, the distribution of rainfall during the crop-growing season is found to be the 
most crucial weather parameter; temperature plays only a minor role.   For wheat, pre-
season precipitation and distribution of temperature during the crop-growing season are 
important.   The role of weather factors in crop growth often means that short duration 
varieties have lower climate induced variability than long duration varieties.  This was 
demonstrated in the case of wheat cultivars by Kalra and Aggarwal (1996). 
Temperature and sunlight do not vary much from year to year.   So although 
they are important determinants of yield growth, they are not major causes of 
production risk.   Strong winds can damage crops and reduce yields.   However, surface 
winds in the country are generally weak with mean daily wind speeds being less than 10 
to 15 km per hour (Government of India, 1976).   Strong winds occur mainly in 
association with cyclonic storms, depressions, thunder or dust storms.   Cyclonic storms 
where wind speeds can reach upto 250 kms per hour are a danger in coastal areas.   In 
sum, rainfall or moisture deficit comes out as the most important weather factor 
affecting crop growth consistently in all studies at all locations.    
  Factors other than rainfall are important especially for horticultural crops.   This 
was shown in a study of apple yields in Himachal Pradesh over the period 1968-88 
(Tewari, 1991).   The study showed that yields were better explained by a composite 
weather index comprising rainfall, temperature and humidity rather than rainfall alone.   
Variation in composite weather index was responsible for about one fourth of variation 
in apple yield in Shimla, Kullu and Kangra, while in Chamba it explained about 50% of 
the variation in apple yield.   
 
2.7  Rainfall Risk 
Except for the south-east peninsula and Kashmir, the country receives between 70-95% 
of annual rainfall during June to September.   Because of the disproportionate 
importance of the monsoon rains, variability in monsoon is a significant factor in 
governing farming practice and variability in yields.   The intensity and degree of 
monsoon rainfall vary from year to year.   The monsoon may set in late with large 
delays in rainfall, have long breaks in July and August or withdraw earlier.    
  18 The onset of monsoon date is variable.   Table 2.3 reproduced from the report of the 
National Commission on Agriculture (Government of India, 1976) documents the 
variation in this variable over the 70 years from 1901-70.   It shows that the range of 
variation in dates of onset in Kerala extends over 6 weeks from May 11 to June 25.   
The median date of onset is June 1 (the mean is May 30) and the standard deviation is 
9 days.    
Even within the monsoon period, it is only a few heavy falls that account for most of 
the annual rainfall in many parts of the country.   For example, in Saurashtra and Kutch, 
only 10% of rainy days account for 50% of annual rainfall.   As a result, outcomes over 
a very short period determine the success of monsoon.   The coefficient of variation of 
monthly rainfall is high in most parts of the country and at most times of the year.   
Table 2.4 tabulates the coefficients of variation of monthly rainfall in different parts of 
the country.   Monthly rainfall variability even in the rainiest months (July and August) 
and areas, is as high as 40 to 50% over most of central, northern and eastern India.   In 
the south excluding the west coast, the coefficient of variation is 60 to 100%.   In 
September, the coefficient is even higher and in October, the uncertainty reaches 80 to 
100% in the southern portions of the peninsula.   In the winter months, the rainfall 
amounts are small and the coefficient of variation is very high.   The variability of weekly 
or fortnightly rainfall is many times greater.   Deficient rainfall during any month of the 
monsoon season is just as likely to be followed in succeeding months by abundant as 
well as deficient rainfall and vice versa.   Hence rainfall is not very predictable.    
In general, the variability of rainfall over short time horizons is much greater than 
over the long horizons.  This is illustrated by Table 2.5 from Biswas (1996).  Thus while 
it might seem that seasonal variability is of order less than 50%, it understates the 
rainfall uncertainty that is faced by the farmer.  Crop management is a continuous 
process and is contingent on expected rainfall not over the entire season but over short 
periods like the next week or next 10 days.  But as Table 2.5 shows rainfall is much less 
predictable over short periods than over the entire season.  Observe that monthly 
variability is much greater than seasonal variability and variability of rainfall in a week is 
usually in excess of 100%.     
Breaks are periods during the southwest monsoon when there is considerable 
diminution of rainfall over large parts of the country.   During the 80 year period 1888 to 
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bulk of the years.   However, the duration of breaks varies from 3 to 21 days and the 
average duration of break was about 4 days in July and 4.5 days in August.   Breaks of 
more than 9 days occurred about 15% of the time in these months.    
A region is regarded as arid if its annual rainfall is less than 500 mm and rainfall 
exceeds potential evapotranspiration in not more than 2 months of the year.  Semi-arid 
tropics have annual rainfall between 500 mm and 1500 mm and rainfall exceeds 
potential evapotranspiration for periods between 2.5 and 7 months in a year (Jodha, 
1981) that limits the growing season to these periods.   For varying definitions, see 
Gadgil et. al (1988), (Gulati and Kelley (1999) and  Walker and Ryan (1990).  The 
noncoastal regions of AP, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, much of Gujarat and 
western and central MP form India’s semi-arid tropics.  The arid and semi-arid tropics 
together account 62% of the country’s gross cropped area and 54% of the value of the 
crop output (Gulati and Kelley, 1999).  Their contribution is particularly high for coarse 
cereals, pulses, oilseeds and cotton.
3   
 
2.8  Droughts and Climate Change 
When rainfall deficiency is widespread, the afflicted area is declared to be suffering 
from drought.   However, there is no universally accepted definition of drought that is 
employed in all situations.   The National Commission of Agriculture defined a 
meteorological drought as an occasion when the rainfall for a week is half of the normal 
or less when the normal weekly rainfall is 5mm or more.   However, from the point of 
view of farming, what is relevant is agricultural drought, which refers to drought during 
the growing season.   An agricultural drought is defined as a period of 4 consecutive 
weeks of (meteorological) drought in the period from middle of May to middle of 
October or 6 such consecutive weeks during the rest of the year.    
On the other hand, the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) defines drought 
as a situation when the deficiency of rainfall in an area is 25% or more of the normal.   
When the deficiency of rainfall is more than 50% of the normal, it is termed as severe 
drought.   Areas where the probability of drought is at least 20% of the time period are 
classified as drought areas while areas where probability of drought is at least 40% are 
chronic drought areas.   Table 2.6 lays out the drought areas and chronic drought areas 
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regions of India.   Recall these are the regions where yield risk is the important risk 
(section 2.3).   
  The quantitative significance of the areas that are drought-prone is brought out 
by Table 2.7 (from Gadgil, et.al, 1988).  The table is based on annual rainfall data for 60 
or more years for 31 meteorological subdivisions covering all India.  This table shows 
that drought occurs once in 2-3 years in about 13% of the country’s geographical area 
and 19% of its dry tropical regions (where mean annual rainfall lies between 350mm 
and 1500mm).  More than half of the area of dry tropics (and about 37% of all-India) 
experiences drought once in every 4 years.  When rainfall deficiency is analysed by the 
time of occurrence during the crop season, Jodha (1981) shows that the mid-season 
drought is the most common type relative to early and late season drought.   
At the national level, systematic records on droughts and rainfall are available 
since 1875.   Table 2.8 from Sivasami (2000) lists the years when widespread droughts 
occurred and the departure of south-west monsoon rainfall from the normal in such 
years.   Widespread drought is defined as when more than 20% of the geographical 
area of the country  is affected.   Since 1877, there has been drought in 25 years i.e., 
about once in 5 years.   In terms of spread, the year 1918 is the most severe, affecting 
more than 70% of area, followed by 1899 (68%), 1877 (59%), 1972 (53%) and 1987 
(48%).    These are not necessarily the years when the maximum departure from 
normal rainfall occurred because the latter refers to all India averages while the former 
relates to spatial spread (which is more relevant).   However, the two are correlated.   
This is shown in Figure 2.4.   There is clearly a positive relation between the extent of 
departure of rainfall from the average (negative) and the severity of drought in terms of 
spatial spread.    
Given this picture one can expect the following.  Long periods of no drought are 
rare.  There have been three periods excluding the most recent from 1987 to 2001 
where there was no drought.   Further, every such long period is likely to be followed by 
at least couple of droughts in close succession.   These statistical regularities suggest 
that the drought of 2002 was overdue and that another drought is likely in next few 
years.   The persistence of statistical regularities is, however, in question because of 
fears about climate change due to man-made factors.   
  21 Scientists have documented the increase in the concentration of greenhouse 
gases especially CO2 in the atmosphere.  This is believed to be the principal cause of 
the increase in global mean temperatures by about 0.3 degrees C over the last century – 
a phenomenon which has been referred to as global warming.  The impact of this 
climate change on agriculture is the subject of recent research.  This is not easy to 
establish because while higher temperatures are expected to have a negative effect on 
crop yields, there are positive effects as well from higher CO2 concentration and higher 
precipitation.  Moreover, scientific uncertainties still persist regarding the climate change 
predictions for the Indian monsoon and in crop growth models that simulate the impact 
of climate on crop yields (Gadgil, 1996).   
 
2.9  Pests and Disease 
A crop is usually attacked by a number of pests that are often selective in the sense that 
they appear at different stages of growth of crop but their virulence varies widely.   The 
loss sustained by a crop depends on the extent and virulence of pest attack.   If the 
attack is of epidemic nature, the crop loss may be total inspite of all other inputs being 
optimal.   Table 2.9 (from National Commission of Agriculture, GoI, 1976) lists some of 
the serious pests and diseases of some of the important crops. 
Loss estimates reported by various state authorities vary under usual conditions 
from 8 to 45% (National Commission of Agriculture, GoI, 1976).   But these estimates 
are of doubtful quality.   Reliable all-India estimates are not available.   Trade figures 
report the average crop loss due to pests and diseases to be 30% of output.   Estimates 
of crop loss vary according to crop and method of estimation.   Furthermore, the figures 
are in the nature of averages or for a particular year and do not regard the loss due to 
pest and disease itself as a random variable.   The averages vary anywhere from 5% to 
50%.   Table 2.10 (from National Commission of Agriculture, GoI, 1976) provides some 
indication of the variability in output because of insect pests and disease as it has data 
on crop loss for two consecutive years.   For instance, between 1967 and 1968, the 
losses in kharif jowar varied from 13% to 27% while for rabi jowar they varied from 11 
to 42%.   Table 2.11 is also revealing.   Data from AP, Orissa and TN reveal the 
standard errors of the percentage loss from pest and disease to be between 0.33 and 
6.32%.   Cotton is a crop that  is subject to serious pest problems.  Sucking pests and 
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pests ranged between 28% to 58% in Madhya Pradesh, 27-52% in Haryana, 40-52% in 
Maharashtra and 54% in Delhi (Gupta, Gupta and Shrivastava, 1998).  Unlike weather 
risks, irrigated regions have no advantages with respect to pest and disease.  In fact, 
they are more prone to crop loss from pests and disease.  
Weather plays a big role in the development of diseases and growth of pests.  
Usually, the pest and disease organisms are always present at a low level of intensity 
and can multiply rapidly when the weather conditions are favourable and the plant 
susceptible to attack (Gadgil, Rao, Joshi and Sridhar, 1996).  In particular, disease 
epidemics are almost always due to favourable weather conditions (Mayee, 1996).   
The causative relationship between weather parameters (such as rainfall, temperature, 
humidity) and pest build up is however very complex and is specific to the pest, crop, 
soil and management practices (Rao and Rao, 1996).   
An example of the complexity of weather induced disease infestation is the case 
of rainfed groundnut in Karnataka (Gadgil, Rao, Joshi and Sridhar, 1996).  The crop is 
generally sown in July and harvested towards the end of about 120 days.  Although this 
is the monsoon period, rainfall is variable and so dry spells alternative with wet spells.  
The dry spells promote the incidence of leafminder attacks (in the middle of the growing 
season) while wet spells promotes crown rot in seedling stage and also the Late Tikka 
disease at the pod-filling stage before harvest which causes black pustules on leaves 
and stem, reduces the leaf area and affects pod-filling.  
The groundnut example also points to the dependence of pest infestation on 
individual farms on cropping choices of others.  In the groundnut case, the crop is 
sowed at about the same time in the entire region (Chitradurga district) that leads to 
uniform crop growth stages over large areas and promotes the growth of certain 
epidemic pests and diseases.
4  In addition, groundnut is cultivated in irrigated lands 
during the summer, which implies the presence of host plants throughout the year.  The 
productivity of the rainfed groundnut in this region is therefore critically dependent on 
the incidence of pests and diseases.  
 
2.10  Market (Price) Risks: Exogenous Shocks 
In subsistence agriculture where farm household’s production is barely sufficient for own 
consumption, market risks are clearly not important.   As farmers start producing for the 
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to anticipate, at the time of planting, the prices that will prevail at the time of sale.   
This is not an easy task.   The consequences of incorrect anticipation can be potentially 
ruinous.    
  The balance of supply and demand determines crop prices.   Variability in prices 
is therefore either due to variability in supply or demand or both.   Note that if the 
variability in either supply or demand is anticipated, so can be the resulting variability in 
prices.   As a result, even if prices are variable, they are not risky for farmers as they are 
anticipated at the time of planting.   Unanticipated variability in demand, i.e., demand 
shocks are usually not large for food crops and vegetables.   The demand for these 
commodities usually changes in a predictable manner with respect to growth of income 
and population.   However, demand shocks can be sizeable for farmers growing 
industrial crops like cotton and jute as their demand is derived from the industrial sector 
and is therefore subject to business cycles in industry.    
  With regard to supply shocks, it is useful to distinguish between exogenous and 
endogenous shocks.   Exogenous shocks are because of yield or production risks that 
have been discussed earlier.   The impact of yield risks on prices depends on the 
elasticity of demand, which measures the response of demand to a change in price.   If 
because of an increase in price, demand does not fall much then the demand for this 
crop is regarded as inelastic.   On the other hand, demand is regarded as elastic when 
an increase in price reduces demand substantially.   Elasticities are expressed in 
percentage terms.   Thus, if the elasticity of demand for a crop is 2, it means that a 
10% change in price leads to a 20% (i.e., twice the proportional change in price) 
change in demand.   It is well known that demand for agricultural commodities and 
especially food crops and vegetables is characterized by low price elasticities that are 
typically less than 1.   Low price elasticities magnify the impact of supply shocks on 
prices.   For instance, if the price elasticity is 0.3, which is a fairly typical figure for 
agricultural commodities, a 5% increase in supply will result in a nearly 16% drop in 
price.   On the other hand, if the price elasticity is 0.7, a similar increase in supply will 
decrease price only by 7%.   Under some assumptions, it can be shown that the 
relationship between supply variability and price variability is given by
5  
CV(p) = CV(q)/(Demand Elasticity) 
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Therefore, smaller is the demand elasticity, greater is the price variability for the same 
variability in supply.   If demand elasticity is highly inelastic, say 0.1, the coefficient of 
variation of price is ten times the coefficient of variation of supply.   It is the inelasticity 
in demand that transforms a small excess into a glut and a minor shortfall into a 
scarcity.   Table 2.12 displays the demand elasticities for some major crops.    
  Not all price variability is bad for farmers.   Indeed, if price fluctuations are only 
due to exogenous production risks, prices and a farmer’s output will be negatively 
correlated through the demand curve.   The negative correlation automatically stabilises 
crop revenue as discussed in section 2.3.   The strength of this correlation depends on 
two factors: (a) the extent to which production risks are systemic risks and (b) the 
importance of demand shocks in price variability.   Greater is the extent to which 
production risks are systemic risks, larger is the correlation between an individual 
farmer’s output and market price.   If demand shocks are independent of production 
risks, then greater is the importance of demand shocks in price variability, smaller is the 
correlation between an individual farmer’s output and price.    
  It follows that if demand shocks are absent and if the systemic risk component 
dominates production risk, then an individual farmer’s output will be strongly and 
negatively correlated with market price.  Such a scenario is likely in remote regions with 
poor transport links.  In such places, a small increase in output can trigger off a large 
decrease in prices.  As a result, farmers can actually be better off when there is partial 
crop failure.  Thakur et.  al (1988) found that in the hill regions of Himachal Pradesh, 
total net returns of farmers are higher when crop output is half of normal crop output as 
prices under this situation are doubled.   This extreme outcome is because of 
underdeveloped markets as a result of which the Himachal hill regions are poorly linked 
to major consuming markets (Thakur et.al, 1997).    
 
2.11  Price Risks: Endogenous shocks and International Trade 
Endogenous shocks arise because of instability in expectations formation that in 
turn leads to fluctuations in planned supply i.e., the area that is planted to a particular 
crop.   The most famous instance of this is the so called cobweb cycle of prices and 
planned supply.   Suppose farmers formulate production plans on the basis of current 
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season.   On the other hand, if current prices are high, all farmers expand supply.   In 
the first case, realized prices in the marketing season will be high but in the second 
case, realized prices will be low.   As a result, in the next production cycle, farmers will 
expand supply in the first case and contract supply in the second case.   Thus, planned 
supply and prices oscillate from glut to shortage.   It should be noted that not all area 
variability is because of variable price expectations.   In some contexts, area variability is 
also a farmer’s response to information about rainfall such as delayed onset of 
monsoons.   This phenomenon will be discussed in the next chapter.    
In the Indian context, cobweb cycles have been suspected for commercial crops 
like rubber, jute and sugarcane.   Figure 2.5  illustrates the area variability in the case of 
jute in West Bengal over the period 1985/86 to 1998/99.   The large swings in area are 
indicative of endogenous shocks as farmers adjust their planned supply in light of their 
expectations of jute prices relative to the prices of competing crops (often paddy).   The 
area variability generates price variability that in turn induces further variability in area.  
Figure 2.6  plots the September jute price and jute area (in West Bengal) over the 
period.  Both variables are expressed as deviations from their trend.  In addition, area 
variable is scaled downwards so that it can be represented in the same picture as price 
and the price variable is deflated with respect to the wholesale price index of all 
commodities.
6  From the figure, the cycles in both variables can be seen.  Consistent 
with a cobweb, the peaks and troughs in planned supply follow the peaks and troughs in 
prices.   
International trade can accentuate or dampen price variability.   To the extent 
that domestic supply shocks are negatively correlated with supply shocks in other 
supplying countries, international trade stabilizes prices.   However, international trade 
also makes endogenous shocks more likely as in a global setting it is hard to coordinate 
supplies as a result of which price cycles are very likely.   Consider for instance the 
contrasting experience of coffee and cardamom growers.   As table 2.13 shows, average 
unit values of coffee have more than halved between 1997/98 and 2001/02 while over 
the same period average unit values of cardamom have doubled.   The good fortune for 
Indian cardamom growers is because of supply shortages from other countries, 
particularly, Guatemala.   On the other hand, the coffee bust is because of additional 
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early 1990s.   Neither the good fortune of the cardamom growers nor the misery of the 
coffee producers will last for ever.   In the case of coffee, supplies will eventually 
contract while in the case of cardamom, prices will shrink as supplies expand.
7  
However, these adjustments are costly and the burden of it is borne by farmers.   Price 
and supply cycles are not confined to export crops.   Arecanut, which is largely used 
domestically, is another crop that has experienced dramatic fluctuations in prices.   From 
levels of Rs.  130-140 per kg in 1999/2000, prices crashed to Rs.  40 per kg in 2001/02.   
Like in another instances, the principal problem is excess supply not because of yield 
risks but because of expansion in planned supplies as measured by the area under the 
crop.    
Left to themselves, markets will tend to produce outcomes that will be regarded 
by farmers as either excessive production or severe scarcity.   The markets for most 
major crops therefore end up being regulated in some fashion in an effort to match 
supply and demand in an orderly way.   Whether these have been effective is an issue 
that will be addressed in later chapters.    
 
2.12  Price Risks: Seasonality 
  A feature of agricultural prices is its seasonality.   This comes about because 
within a crop year, harvests occur at limited number of discrete time points, often not 
more than once and rarely more than twice while the commodity is consumed 
throughout the year.   As a result, the commodity is stored and carried from the 
production points to the consumption points.   Storage causes prices within a crop year 
to have a well-defined pattern.   For instance, if there is only harvest in a year, prices 
will typically be minimum at the beginning of the marketing year and will move upwards 
to peak just before the beginning of the new marketing year.   Price variability must 
therefore distinguish between variability across years (annual) and variability within a 
crop year (seasonal).    
  For farmers who sell most of their crop at harvest, it is the annual variability in 
harvest price that is of most concern.   Variability in the seasonal margin (i.e., the price 
difference between the harvest low and the off-season peaks) matters most to those 
agents who store the crop.   It has often been claimed that farmers and especially the 
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than harvest.   It might then seem that seasonal uncertainty does not matter to farmers 
and is more of a concern to traders and speculators rather than to farmers.   However, 
this is not entirely true.   Storage agents are also risk-averse.   When seasonal prices are 
highly variable, storage is a risky enterprise and the agents who undertake will demand 
a risk premium.   As a result, the seasonal margin needs to be larger which would 
depress the harvest price.    
  Fuglie and Ramaswami (2001) compared average seasonal margins in potato 
between India and the United States.   Both markets are characterized by sharply 
seasonal production and year-round demand.   In both countries, cold storage is the 
principal means of keeping potatoes for year-round supply.   Table 2.14 shows the 
average seasonal price trend and the variation around trend for major potato markets in 
the two countries.   The average seasonal trend shows only the relative change in prices 
over a storage season because it is computed after removing annual shocks.   On 
average, prices during the storage season rose by 43% above harvest prices in the 
United States.   In India, the average seasonal price increase was 113%.   Note also 
that in both countries, price variation around the seasonal trend rose steadily during the 
storage season.   However, uncertainty in seasonal prices was nearly twice as high in 
India compared with the United States.   After comparing the physical costs of storage, 
wastage and the costs of credit, Fuglie and Ramaswami conclude that much of the 
difference in the seasonal margin was due to the risk premium demanded by storage 
agents in India because of the higher uncertainty in seasonal prices in India.   The 
implication is that if policies and institutions could reduce seasonal price uncertainty, it 
would also reduce the costs of storage and thereby increase the potato prices at 
harvest.
8   
The importance of risk costs in the Indian case is reflective of the limited ability 
of Indian trading firms to bear market risks and of the lack of effective market 
mechanisms to guide the allocation of supplies such as timely production estimates, 
stock reports and price discovery mechanisms.   In the U.S., on the other hand, 
marketing institutions have resulted in low seasonal price variability.   These institutions 
include forward contracting, futures trading and dissemination of market information by 
government agencies.      
  28 2.13  Income Fluctuations: Magnitude 
The ICRISAT village studies collected information on household income and 
consumption.   Recall that out of the sample of 40 households in each village, 30 
households were cultivator households and 10 were landless labour households.   Hence 
the major components of household income were crop revenue and labour income 
(Walker and Ryan, 1990).   Except for the large farm households, cultivator households 
also received substantial labour market earnings.   Labour market income was primarily 
from agriculture as nonfarm income did not exceed 30% of total income in any of the 
villages.   Therefore, the income fluctuations may be taken to reflect variability in 
incomes derived from agriculture whether from crop revenue or from the labour market.   
The income fluctuations were calculated after deflating incomes and removing linear 
trends.    
  The analysis reported in Walker and Ryan draws on data from more than 100 
households in 3 villages across the three study regions (see table 2.1).   The median 
coefficient of variation of the per capita household income was about 30%.   The low 
figure in the sample was about 10% while the high figure was about 80%.   For the 
majority of households, the coefficients of variation were in the range of 20 to 40%.   
Thus, income risks are considerable in the rural households of the semi-arid tropics.   
Surprisingly, income variability does not differ that much by farm-size class.   Similarly, 
while the correlation coefficient between per capita income levels and household income 
coefficient of variation is negative, it is not large indicating perhaps the ability of richer 
households to bear income shocks.   About one-third of households in the sample 
suffered income losses that reduced income in a particular year to less than 50% of 
their median income over the period 1975/76 to 1984/85.   Shortfall households were 
more numerous in drought-prone villages than in the rainfall-assured village.    
 
2.14  Conclusions 
The diversity of climate, growing conditions and market structures means that there is 
no typical risk environment for a farmer.   In the drylands without access to assured 
irrigation, rainfall is a dominant production risk.   There are, however, many attributes of 
rainfall – the relevance of the onset date of monsoon and the distribution of rainfall 
through the season varies according to crop and soil type.   The spatial spread of rainfall 
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individual specific depending on the year and the region.   Similar is the case with pests 
and disease.   Local pest and disease infestations depend on many factors including the 
crop variety, weather, the use of pesticides and other crop practices.   Beyond a 
threshold level, the infestation can quickly reach epidemic proportions affecting large 
areas.   Unlike rainfall risks, the humid and irrigated regions have no special advantage 
with respect to pest and disease attacks.    
  As the demand for agricultural products is inelastic, supply shocks are magnified 
in price variations.   Besides production risks, supply shifts are also because of variability 
in planned supply, i.e., area planted to a particular crop.   Variability in planned supply 
comes about because of errors in forecasting prices.   Often, the biases in these errors 
are systematic as forecasts are determined by past prices.   As a result, prices and 
planned supply can oscillate creating endogenous variability.   Such uncertainty is often 
seen in seasonal price movements as well.   The importance of price risk would depend 
on the extent of exposure to market forces as well as existing market institutions.   
International trade can increase or decrease price variability.    
  In later chapters, we consider individual farmer and societal responses to risk.   
We also consider government programs and policies that have shaped the risk 
environment.   
  30 Figure 2.1:  Classification of Risks 
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  31 Figure 2.2: Yield Versus Price Risk in Semi-Arid Districts of AP, Karnataka, 




Notes:  This figure is from Barah and Binswanger (1982) and reproduced in Walker and 







  32 Figure 2.3:  Price and Yield Perceptions of groundnut and paddy producers in 
Dokur, 1982/83 – 1985/86. 
 
 
Notes:  Figure is reproduced from Walker and Ryan (1990: figure 8.3).






Source: Sivasami (2000) 





























































Source:  Our calculations based on area and price data for jute from the report of the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (2001a) and from the Economic Survey. 
  
 
  35 Table 2.1.  Soil, rainfall & crop characteristics of the ICRISAT study regions 
 
 







Aurepalle          Dokur  Shirapur       Kalman  Kanzara     Kinkheda 




Deep black heavy 
clay soils (vertisols) 
in lowlands; 
shallower lighter soils 
in uplands 
 






Low water retention 
capacity 
High water retention 
capacity 
 Medium water 
retention capacity 
Rainfall
b  Unassured; 
pronounced rainfall 
uncertainty at sowing 
630 mm, 31%CV 
Unassured;  
Frequent crop failure 
630 mm, 35%CV 
Assured; 
890 mm, 22%CV 
Pattern of 
cropping 
Kharif, or rainy season 
cropping 
 Rabi, or post-rainy 
season cropping 
Kharif cropping 
Major crops  Kharif or rainy season 
sorghum, castor, pearl 
millet, paddy (rice), 
pigeon pea, groundnut 
Rabi or post rainy 
season sorghum, 




pigeon pea, wheat 
Irrigation   Agricultural 
intensification around 
dug wells & tanks 
Some dug wells  Limited irrigation 
sources in 1970s & 
early 80s 










Harijans & caste 
rigidities; inequitable 
distribution of land  





   
a  loosely called medium-deep Vertisols 
b  the main rainfall estimates & their coefficients of variation (CVs) in percent refer to ten 
annual observations collected in one study village in each region from 1975/76-1984/85 
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Table 2.2.  Definitions & incidence of crop failure from 1975-76 to 1977-78 
 
Regions 
Mahbubnagar Sholapur  Aloka 
All regions  Definitions 



















8.9 24.2  6.9  16.7 
Average rainfall**  736  659  806  737 
Total no. of  plots  826  2058  921  3805 
 
*   Includes sole crops as well as intercrops 
**Simple average of daily recordings from rain gauges in the two villages in each region 
for the three cropping years 
 
Source:  Singh and Walker (1984) 
 
  37 Table 2.3.   Frequency distribution of dates of onset of southwest 
monsoon over Kerala & Bombay-1901-70 
 
Number of years  Dates 
Kerala Bombay 
11-15 5  0 
15-20 8  0 
21-25 7  1 
May 
26-31 12  3 
1-5 20  12 
6-10 14  22 
11-15 3  25 
16-20 0  4 
June 
21-25 1  3 
Mean date  May 30  June9 
Median date  June 1  June9 




   
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, (1976), Report of 
the National Commission on Agriculture, Chapter 13 
 
  38 Table 2.4.  Coefficient of Variation of Rainfall by Season and Region 
 
Period  Region  Constant of variation (CV) 
Kashmir & North East Assam  40-50%  January-February 
Elsewhere 80-100% 
Assam 30-40% 
West Bengal, South Kerala  40-50% 
March-May 
Elsewhere 80-100% 
West Coast, N.E.  Assam  30-40%  June 
Elsewhere 60-100% 
East of longitude  80
0 E(Chennai-
Jabalpur-Bareilly) & along west coast 
40% or less 
North east India  50-100% 
July-August 
Peninsula or leeside of ghats-MP, 
Karnataka, Rayalseema & 
Tamil Nadu 
80-100% 
September  Peninsula including coast  60% or more 
Southern peninsula & Assam  60%  October-December 
Elsewhere 80-100% 
Tamil Nadu & Kerala  60-80%  November 
Elsewhere 80-100% 
South east Tamil Nadu  80-100%  December 
Elsewhere >100% 
 
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, (1976), Report of 
the National Commission on Agriculture, Chapter 13 






























Hissar  45  47  94 71 83 141  174  118  156  261 
Indore  18  26  81 52 76 69 117  91  109  129 
Rajkot  29  34  58 66 65 59 103  109  140  103 
Solapur  28  30  59 43 43 58 104  96  119  109 
Hyderabad  28  30  59 43 43 58 104  96  119  109 
Bangalore  20  30  50 59 63 56 101  106  110  97 
Source: Biswas (1996), p 191 
 
 
Table 2.6.  Drought Prone Areas and Rainfall Deficiency 
 
Drought areas  Rainfall deficiency 
Gujarat, Rajasthan & adjoining parts of Punjab, 
Haryana, west Uttar Pradesh & west Madhya 
Pradesh. 
Madhya Maharashtra, interior Mysore, Rayalaseema, 
south Telengana and parts of Tamilnadu.  
A small portion of northwest Bihar and adjoining 
east Uttar Pradesh. 
A small portion of north-east Bihar and adjoining 
portion of West Bengal 
20% probability of rainfall 
deficiency of more than 25 % of 
normal 
West Rajastan & Kutch  40% probability of rainfall 
deficiency of more than 25 % of 
normal 
 
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Report of the 
National Commission on Agriculture (1976), Chapter 13 
  40 Table 2.7.  Distribution (in percentages) of geographical area, rural 
population and cropped area in India, according to degree of recurrence of 
drought. 
 











2-3 years  13.2  5.8  11.2  18.6  9.4  14.7 
3 years  11.6  12.6  14.5  15.6  18.9  18.4 
4 years  36.5  39  42.4  51.4  62.9  55.7 
5 years  30.9  38.2  30.4  14.4  8.7  11.2 
> 5 years  7.8  4.4  1.4  -  -  - 
Total 100 100 100  100  100  100 
 




  41 Table 2.8. South-west monsoon rainfall, negative departure from 
normal & area affected by drought 
 
Year %  departure 
(-) from normal rainfall 
% area affected by 
drought 
1877 33.3  59.4 
1891 6.3  22.7 
1899 29.4  68.4 
1901 12.1  30.0 
1904 11.8  34.4 
1905 11.4  37.2 
1907 10.0  29.1 
1911 14.7  28.4 
1913 10.0  24.5 
1915 9.4  22.2 
1918 24.9  70.0 
1920 16.7  38.0 
1925 3.3  21.1 
1939 8.7  28.5 
1941 13.3  35.5 
1951 18.7  35.1 
1965 18.2  38.2 
1966 13.2  35.4 
1972 23.9  52.6 
1974 12.0  34.0 
1979 18.9  34.6 
1982 14.5  29.1 
1985 7.1  32.3 
1986 12.7  19.7 
1987 19.4  47.7 
 
Source: The Drought of 1987,Response and Management, Volume 1(1989), Ministry of 
Agriculture, Government of India, reproduced in Sivasami (2000). 
  42 Table 2.9.   Serious insect pests & diseases of some of the important crops 
 
Crops Insects  Diseases 
Paddy  Gundhy bugs, green leafhoppers, 
 White leaf hoppers, swarming 
caterpillar, caseworm, gallmidge, 
Hispa, grasshoppers, stemborer, 
Mealy bug, army worms, ear cutting 
caterpillar 
 
Blast, stem rot, root rot, 
Bacterial leaf blight, foot rot, 
helminthosporium 
Jowar, maize, 
bajra & lesser 
millets 
Stem borer, earhead webbing 
caterpillar, black hairy caterpillar, 
Midge, decan wingless grasshopper, 
grasshopper (maize) 
Hairy caterpillar (jowar) 
Grain smut, loose smut downy 
mildew (jowar), smut (millet). 
Downy mildew (maize), grain 
earthed disease (bajra) 





Yellow rust, covered smut 
(barley, oats), black rust, stripe 
disease (barley) 
Cotton  White fly, pink bollworm, spotted 
bollworms, stem borer, jassids, 
semiloopers, aphids, field cricket, 
grey weevil, gram weevil, 
leaf roller 
Wilt, black arm, anthracnose, 
grey mildew 




Top borer, stem borer 
Red rot, smut 
 
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation,(1976), Report of the 
National Commission on Agriculture, Chapter 49 
 
Table 2.10.    Cropwise all India percentage losses due to insect pests & 





Percentage loss during 
kharif 
Percentage loss during Rabi  Crop 
1967 1968 1967-68  1968-69 
Paddy  17.80 19.28 6.77  20.73 
Wheat  - - 3.36  3.58 
Maize  6.57 6.58 -  - 
Bajra  11.91  - - - 
Jowar  12.90 26.92 11.26 41.84 
 
*Evaluation Study of the High Yielding Varieties Programme, Planning Commission 
quoted in Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (1976), Report of 
National Commission on Agriculture, Chapter 49. 
 
  43 Table 2.11.  Average percentage loss in yield of paddy, due to incidence of all 




*  District  Crop season & 
duration of variety  Estimate S.E. 
Sarad LDV
**  13.00 2.63 
Dalua SDV
**  7.13 6.32 
Cuttack 
Samba LDV
**  11.38 5.72 
Kuruvai SDV  4.39  1003 
Kuruvai MDV  3.25  0.33 
Samba LDV  10.46  1.65 
Thanjavur 
Thaladi LDV  3.96  4,15 
Kharif LDV  10.57  2.06  West Godavari 
Rabi MDV  14.43  2.95 
 
*   For district 
**Stand respectively for short (less than 100 days) medium (100-300) & long (over 130       
days) duration varieties 
1Singh,D.  et al 1971.  Estimates of incidence of diseases & consequent field losses in 
yield of paddy crop, Indian Phytopath, 24, 446-456, quoted in Government of India, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, (1976), Report of the National Commission on 
Agriculture  Chapter 49 
 
 
Table 2.12.  Range of price elasticities of demand (all India) 
Rural Urban  Crop 
Low Medium  High  Low Medium  High 
Rice   -0.23  -1.07  -1.90  -0.26  -1.08  -1.90 
Wheat -0.19  -0.95  -1.70  -0.19  -0.98  -1.76 
Coarse cereals  -0.24  -0.53  -0.82  -0.07  -0.18  -0.43 
Pulses -0.51  -0.89  -1.27  -0.5  -0.51  -0.52 
Edible oils  -0.50  -0.51  -0.52  -0.36  -0.43  -0.50 
Sugar -0.39  -0.48    -0.57  -0.33  -0.36  -0.39 
Cotton (cloth)  -0.38  -0.38  -0.38  -0.38  -0.38  -0.38 
 
Notes: Table is reproduced from Gulati and Kelley, (1999).  They selected the elasticities 


















Coffee Cardamom   Year  




1997-98 99.13  273.3 
1998-99 92.15  566.65 
1999-2000 67.58  488.19 
2000-01 53.87  570.41 
2001-02 43.31  - 
 
Source:  Economic Times, 8 February, 2002 
 
Table 2.14. Trend and variation of producer prices 
during potato storage season 
 
Location      Month following harvest of the potato 
crop 
    Harvest  1 2 3 4 5 6 
India (Meerut)  Seasonal price 
trend  
1.00  1.33 1.71 2.01 2.21 2.14 2.13 
 Coefficient  of 
variation  





1.00  1.20 1.17 1.21 1.32 1.40 1.42 
 Coefficient  of 
variation  
--  7% 7% 13%  12%  17%  18% 
 
Source: Fuglie and Ramaswami (2001) 
 
  45 Chapter 3: Risk Management at the Farm Household Level 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw how Indian farm households must often cope not only 
with poverty but also with extremely variable incomes.  Weather variation, fluctuations 
in wages, the incidence of disease, pests and a host of other less obvious factors cause 
farm incomes to fluctuate unpredictably.  Variations in the price of marketed output can 
also cause farm revenues to vary.   
This chapter examines the impact of farm income risk on farmer behaviour and 
welfare.  The existing literature on idiosyncratic income uncertainty examines its effects 
on farm households in India, investigating in particular their vulnerability to crop and 
agricultural income shocks.  Research has found that crop income shock reduces 
household wealth not only directly, but also indirectly as a result of the costly measures 
adopted by households to protect consumption from such shocks.  These include 
choosing safer but also less profitable agricultural investments, and either the ex ante 
diversion of productive capital toward more liquid assets or the ex post sale of such 
assets for consumption smoothing.   
In understanding farmer responses to risk, a useful distinction can be made 
between risk reducing strategies that the farmer adopts ex ante and risk coping 
strategies that the farmer adopts ex post the shock.  If a risk averse household is not 
able to achieve an entirely smooth consumption path through ex post mechanisms such 
as insurance, savings, and credit transactions, it has an incentive to devote resources 
ex-ante in an effort to secure a more stable income stream.  In an agricultural economy, 
households might adopt technologies such as inter-cropping or drought- resistant crops, 
farm a diversified portfolio of land, and enter contractual arrangements such as 
sharecropping that reduce the variance of income, or diversify their activities through 
migration or local non-agricultural employment.  Any of these ex ante actions might be 
costly, in that the households would be sacrificing income, on average, in order to 
assure a more stable stream of income.   
It is also likely that community mechanisms exist in some villages to allocate risk 
efficiently.  Within a community risk pooling can be achieved through formal insurance 
markets, or through a variety of informal transfer mechanisms as well as drawing upon 
  46 communal resources.  Risk management at the community level is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Our main goal in this chapter is to discuss farmer strategies to combat risk.  We 
have divided these strategies into five broad categories that are the following.    
a) Self-insurance where households use own wealth to protect themselves against 
uncertainties that they cannot control.  Self-insurance can work through several 
channels.  Stocks of cash or savings in banks can be run down (or added to) for the 
purpose.  The same can be done with grain stocks, although holding such stocks can be 
costly because grain is not perfectly durable.  However this may be preferred form of 
savings if rural banks are few and far between or if there are restrictions on the rapid 
liquidation of savings.  Other assets may be run down or accumulated as well.  Livestock 
and jewelry are two such assets.   
b) The second major form of smoothing is taking recourse to credit.  There are formal or 
institutional lenders: government banks, co-operative societies, commercial banks, credit 
bureaus etc as well as informal lenders: moneylenders, traders, employers etc.  
Institutional credit agencies often insist on collateral before advancing a loan.  For poor 
peasants, however, this usually makes formal credit an infeasible option.  This is not 
because they lack collateral but because their collateral is often of a very specific kind 
e.g. labour, house or small landholding that might not be acceptable to the lenders.  
This makes informal credit more popular among the poor.   
c) The third strategy for mitigating risk is tenancy contract, particularly sharecropping 
which is the most popular form of tenancy contract.  Sharecropping is an arrangement 
that has particular value when the tenant is small and averse to risk: if a given fraction 
of output is paid as rent, then the tenant is, to some extent, insulated against output 
fluctuations, because he can share some of these fluctuations with his landlord.  The 
lack of perfect credit and insurance markets make land contracts solve the problem of 
insurance, however it must also provide adequate incentive at the same time.   
d) Labour markets provide alternative mechanisms to deal with risk by allowing 
households subject to idiosyncratic shocks to shift from own-farm cultivation to the 
labour market and to avoid uncertainties of the slack season; many landless workers 
enter ‘permanent’ labour contracts.   
  47 e) Crop management where risk is diversified through the choice of technology as well 
as the choice of investment portfolio and its composition of productive and non-
productive assets, choice of inputs, choice of cropping pattern including crop 
diversification and intercropping.  As we shall see, there exists a positive association 
between the average returns to individual production decision and their sensitivity to 
risk.   
Tenancy, permanent labour contracts and specific crop management strategies 
such as diversified farming and intercropping are ex-ante risk adjustment devices.  Self-
insurance, credit, migration and many crop management strategies are ex-post risk 
coping devices. As Jodha (1981) points out, the ex-ante strategies are often identified as 
permanent features of the farming system and therefore their role in risk management 
is sometimes overlooked.   
 
3.2 Self Insurance 
The most important mechanism for consumption smoothing, other than market credit 
and intra- or interfamily lending, is the sale and purchase of assets.  Agricultural 
households hold many different forms of wealth including land, capital goods such as 
pump sets and tractors, animals, jewelry, currency, and stocks of food grain.  Self-
insurance relates to using such assets as buffer stocks; that is, farmers accumulate 
stocks in periods of relative affluence and deplete these reserves to finance consumption 
expenditures during tough times.   
There are several studies based on the ICRISAT villages (described in section 2.4 
and summarized in table 2.1) that explain various self-insurance mechanisms adopted 
by villagers to smooth shocks.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), is one such study that 
concludes that rural households engage in substantial buying and selling of certain 
forms of assets for self-insurance.  In this study, immobile capital such as land and 
buildings constitute a major part of farmers’ wealth, accounting for approximately 85% 
of total wealth. A common observation of most studies based on ICRISAT data is that 
the asset market for land is curiously inactive although the market for land rentals is 
very active in these regions. This observation is corroborated by findings of a survey by 
NCAER in 1970-71  where only 1.5% of all rural households surveyed undertook any 
kind of land sale, so this is a rarely used mechanism to finance consumption. Among the 
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share - less than 5% even for large farmers.  Average crop inventories held over the 
year accounts for about a quarter of this wealth; however, it varies a lot across harvest 
and non-harvest seasons, and is probably used more to smooth consumption over the 
year rather than across years.  A sizeable portion of about 19% on average of non-land 
wealth is held in the form of jewelry, but the data indicate that buying and selling of 
jewelry too is minimal. The largest component of non-land wealth is bullocks - about 
50% of the wealth for small farmers, over 33% for midsize ones, and about 27% for the 
large farmers. Their work finds strong evidence that farmers vary their ownership of 
bullocks as a primary instrument to smooth consumption.  In another study, Jodha 
(1981) looked at data from many parts of India and finds that the most common asset 
sale during droughts is that of livestock followed by jewelry.  
There is an extremely well organized, regionally integrated market for bullocks, 
however, short-term bullock leases are extremely uncommon.  The absence of rental 
market for bullocks implies that there can be substantial productivity gains of ownership 
of a few bullocks to farmers; therefore, turnover in bullock ownership should be 
expected to be low.  A ten-year survey, however, revealed that 86% of households were 
involved in at least one transaction in bullocks, indicating that many of these were 
perhaps motivated to meet consumption requirements. The data indicates that this is 
indeed the case. The presence of well-integrated market for bullock makes bullock 
prices immune to village specific production shocks, the evidence for this being that over 
60% of bullock sales were made to buyers outside the village, with 10% going to buyers 
located more than 20 kilometers away. The data indicates that sales of bullocks increase 
significantly where weather outcomes are poor, and hence incomes are low, and 
purchases of bullocks increase when rainfall is ample and incomes are above average, in 
contrast to all other productive assets, inclusive of land. The results also show that the 
likelihood of a bullock purchase increases significantly when income is high, and the 
probability of a sale decreases. It is also seen that a farmer holding larger stocks of 
bullocks is less likely to make a purchase in the future, which suggests that farmers try 
to maintain a target level of the asset on an average.  In data, while this hypothesis 
holds strongly for medium and small farmers, the fit is much weaker for large farmers, 
implying that they have much better access to credit and other instruments and 
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smoothing.   
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) also suggest that the widespread incidence of 
“distress sales” together with the absence of rental markets for animals hamper 
efficiency and lower average agricultural output. The statistical results show that the 
optimal number of bullocks owned by mid-sized farmers is about two.  However the 
average size of the bullock stock is 0.94, which implies a sizeable under-investment in 
bullocks. Thus, risk aversion of a farmer together with borrowing constraints and low 
incomes not only results in output losses but also worsens the fluctuations in incomes. 
Simulations of their econometric model, which provides a reasonable fit to the life-cycle 
data on bullock accumulations for low income and middle income farmers suggest that 
(1) despite farmer’s aversion to risk the provision of actuarially fair weather insurance 
would have no to little effect on farmer welfare, consistent with the almost universal 
resistance of farmers to unsubsidized insurance schemes. This is in part due to farmers’ 
evident ability to insure a minimum level of consumption via informal arrangements and 
because of the importance of other risk factors. (2) Increases in opportunities for farm 
households to receive assured streams of income, say through a rural job creation 
policy, raises bullock stocks closer to optima levels and have a substantial positive effect 
on agricultural production efficiency and output.  
The role of crop inventories is investigated by Lim and Townsend (1994), who 
construct measures of changes in farm inventory, real assets, currency and financial 
assets from the household data of the ICRISAT village studies.  They find that crop 
inventory plays a relatively large role as a mechanism in the monthly and annual data to 
smooth shocks.  Currency also plays a role, especially in annual data.  These results are 
consistent with the results of Paxson and Chaudhuri (1994), who conclude that buffer 
stocks are responsible for the observed degree of smoothing.   They also find patterns, 
by land class – relatively large landholders tend to use crop inventory while relatively 
small and landless holders tend to use currency.  This fact, as explained by Walker and 
Ryan (1990) is due to difference in storage capability.  Larger farmers are better 
equipped to store grains across seasons than poor farmers who find it easier to sell the 
grains upon harvest and use currency as smoothing mechanism.  The unimportance of 
crop inventories in farmer’s loss management strategies is also endorsed by Jodha’s 
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are important but in the form of fuelwood, dung, dried vegetables and other goods. 
Besides these, there might be another interesting mechanism adopted by rural 
households aimed at mitigating income risk and facilitating consumption smoothing in an 
environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks, as claimed 
by Rosenzweig and Stark (1989).  A significant part of migration in India, particularly in 
rural areas, is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage.  This study 
explains these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among Indian 
households.  In particular, they hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to 
locationally distant, dispersed yet kinship-related households is a manifestation of 
implicit inter-household contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risk and 
facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs 
and spatially covariant risks.  Analysis of ICRISAT data lends support to the hypothesis.  
Marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of 
household food consumption.  Farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend 
to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration.   
 
3.3.  Insurance through Credit 
The principal sources of rural credit are institutional sources (banks, cooperatives), 
professional moneylenders, traders, and friends and relatives.  The All India Rural Credit 
Survey, published by the RBI, reveals that in 1951 only 7.2% of all borrowings were 
from government sources, banks and co-operatives.  By 1981, this number had jumped 
to 61.2% (Bell, 1993) due mainly to the Indian government’s substantial drive to extend 
rural credit through official channels.  Individual moneylenders however, did not vanish; 
24.3% of all debt was still owed to them.   
  Formal or institutional credit is mostly for working capital or for investment.  
Consumption loans to tide over bad times are not officially offered by institutional 
lenders.  At best, institutions can reschedule loans in the event of generalized crop 
failure.  NABARD, which is a government owned development bank specialized in rural 
finance, provides refinance to banks and other lending institutions in rural areas.  This 
facility also extends to rescheduling of loans against crop failure but does not apply to 
loan rescheduling against price risk.   
  51 A common observation of most studies is that the institutional credit sector is marred 
by lack of financial discipline. As against the social consequences of defaulting on a loan 
in the informal market, failure to repay loans from official sources does not carry any 
stigma.  In  comparison to the informal sector, the recovery rate of institutional loans 
and in particular of cooperative credit, is extremely low. Only 40% of loans were 
recovered by the co-operative societies in Maharashtra in 1980 (Walker and Ryan, 
1990).  Co-operative Bank of Kannauj claimed to have recovered 50% of loans extended 
in 1998 (Ravi, 2002).  The poor performance arises even though there is a 
comprehensive legal framework for recovery of loans.   
Walker and Ryan (1990) report that almost all institutional loans have a collateral 
requirement in the form of land or third party guarantees.  Third party surety is 
especially common in Akola villages of ICRISAT.   Loan rescheduling and subsequent 
term conversions are almost always preferred to recovering collateral.  Gold still has a 
considerable value as collateral in the formal sector.  43% of institutional loan taken by 
respondents in a survey of rural residents in Kerala (Ravi, 2002) are ‘gold loans’ from co-
operative banks.  Even though credit institutions attempt to ensure the productive use of 
funds, a loan is fungible and often diverted to alternative uses.  For example, in the 
Akola villages only about two fifths of the initial loans were destined exclusively for 
agricultural productive purposes for which they were taken.
9  There were some leakages 
associated with another two fifths , although the bulk of the loans were spent on 
productive investments.  About one-tenth of the borrowers used their first loans entirely 
to repay moneylenders.  Institutional sources, however still finance proportionally more 
investment for agricultural production that informal sources.
10   
Well-developed traditional money-lending system still exists in most rural areas of 
the country and the number of moneylenders would have been much higher if it wasn’t 
for the competition from subsidized institutional credit.  As Walker and Ryan [1990] 
explain from the ICRISAT villages and as is observed by Ravi (2002) in U.P., farmers are 
associated in a personalized long term relationship extending over several years with a 
single moneylender.  Switching from one moneylender to another is feasible but not 
common. In the ICISAT regions, transactions are mostly held in secrecy.  However, if 
there are delays in loan recovery then details about client’s borrowing can be made 
public.  Most moneylenders, however, exchange information regarding clients. 
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creditors, explicitly lend for consumption and production.  This observation also holds in 
villages of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala as noted in the rural household survey of Ravi 
(2002). There is very low level of financial intermediation among and between informal 
lenders in the ICRISAT villages. Informal lenders do not accept time deposits and lend 
solely out of equity because of seasonality and covariate risk.  
Villagers face sharply different borrowing opportunities, depending on their wealth, 
social status and reputation. Ryan and Walker (1990) observe that the landless are 
effectively excluded from the informal credit market except for borrowing very small 
amounts.  Farmers are segmented into two loan classes, medium term and seasonal, 
varying markedly in term structure and interest rate as well as the monitoring activity by 
the moneylender.  There is no long term lending in any of the ICRISAT villages. A 
precise repayment schedule is often not fixed in advance.  The rates of interest charged 
vary from 18% in Andhra Pradesh villages to 40% in Maharashtra villages of ICRISAT.  
In Uttar Pradesh, however, Ravi (2002) finds that there is a fixed repayment schedule 
on loans from moneylenders as well as from cold- storages, both within the village as 
well as outside.  Cold storages extend credit to the farmers but are not a very common 
source. The rate of interest charged varies from 2% to 6% per month by moneylenders 
but is more uniform from cold-storages. 
Majority of medium term loans in the ICRISAT villages are given without security; 
collateral is only demanded of relatively unreliable clients.  Collateral for most seasonal 
short-term loans is the standing crop as reported in Ryan and Walker. This is consistent 
with Ravi (2002), for loans offered by traders and cold storages and among 
moneylenders within the village. Collateral value of land has sharply declined because 
several state governments no longer honour promissory notes issued to moneylenders. 
Collateral substitutes have assumed primary importance in conditioning repayment 
incentives.  The threat of loss of future borrowing opportunities is perhaps the most 
important. 
 One of the popular forms of borrowing and lending that is almost exclusively used 
by women is chit-funds, which are essentially revolving credit and savings societies.  In 
Palaghat, all the 9 villages that Ravi (2002) surveyed had a chit-fund scheme called 
‘Kudumbashree’, with active participation from women and landless labourers.  In the 
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Walker (1990) point out, the only women who are not completely rationed out of the 
credit market are widows who are the heads of households.  Furthermore, they are not 
offered long term labour contracts therefore they cannot obtain loans via labour-credit 
linkages.    
While we have so far reviewed credit arrangements in informal as well as formal 
credit markets, let us now turn to the performance of the credit market as an ex post 
mechanism for smoothing income fluctuations to that of transfers and quantify the 
extent to which inter-household transfers substitute for credit arrangements.  
Rosenzweig (1988) studied the ICRISAT villages of Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara.  He 
looked at the response of net household borrowing to exogenous income movements.  
The results indicate that credit behaves similarly to transfers in responding to income 
changes.  Credit appears on average to play a greater role in smoothing income – at the 
sample means credit compensates for 11.3% of shortfalls in normal income as 
compared to the mean 2% transfer rate.  Another important difference between credit 
and transfers as income ‘insurance’ is the greater extent to which own wealth influences 
the contribution of credit to income smoothing.  Households with little endowed wealth 
rely much more heavily in credit relative to transfers than do wealthy households. The 
estimation results in Rosenzweig suggest that for an otherwise average household with 
no accumulated assets, the rate at which credit is used to smooth consumption would 
be almost seven times that at which transfers are used. For households with a net 
inherited wealth of Rs.100,000  (1983 Rupees), less than one standard deviation above 
the mean, however, the transfer rate is almost a third of the rate at which credit 
contributes to income smoothing. The estimated wealth-transfer rate and wealth debt 
rates also suggest that credit market insurance is viewed as inferior to transfers by the 
ICRISAT households.   
 
3.4   Land Tenure and Risk 
“Tenancy contracts allow farmers to make better use of individual endowments and to 
arrive at combinations of income, effort and risk that reflect their endowments and 
tastes”, noted Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984). The overall findings from various 
studies are consistent with this view and although the data from ICRISAT villages 
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explanation for most transactions center on resource adjustment. A careful evaluation of 
the terms and conditions of land transactions implies that one impetus for tenancy is risk 
sharing.  
Agricultural tenancy is common but not predominant in the ICRISAT villages.  
Table 3.1 provides details of tenancy contracts in the ICRISAT villages. Whereas about 
20% of all households sharecrop, far less, below 5%, are fixed rent tenants.  It is also 
interesting that 80% of all tenants cultivate some land that they own (Shaban, 1987). 
The land-lease market is quite active and overall, sharecropping is dominant as a mode 
of tenancy.   Reverse-leasing – the leasing of land from relatively small to relatively 
large farmers is also observed.  Shaban (1987) notes from the ICRISAT data that on 
average, in tenancy relationships, 47% of the partners come from the same farm size 
group, 32% of leasing was reverse and 22% of land was leased by large farmers to 
smaller ones.  In one of the villages, Dokur, reverse tenancy accounted for 55%.   
Shaban (1987) covered leases that are predominantly of brief duration, mostly 
not exceeding one year.  Nearly to 60% of the contracts in the region were for only one 
cropping season.  Another common feature of the ICRISAT region, noted in several 
studies is that landlords rotate their tenants frequently.  The long term tenancy relation 
is almost non-existent in these villages.  In a survey of twelve villages of Kannauj district 
in Uttar Pradesh, however, Ravi (2002) observes cases of long term tenancy relation 
called rehan.  These might be due to widespread existence of absentee landlords in the 
region. However, even here, these are few and far between. The reduction in long term 
tenancy across several states can be ascribed largely to land reform legislation that 
makes it easy for long standing tenants to acquire ownership of the plot.  The 
detrimental impact of this legislation being that with limited tenure, the tenant has little 
incentive to apply proper amounts of inputs such as manure, fertilizer etc that are 
known to have residual and lasting effects on crop yields.   
Jodha (1978) who evaluates the terms and conditions of sharecropping 
transactions in the ICRISAT villages, makes the following generalizations: 1) There is 
large variety in leasing conditions to reflect individual landowner and tenant 
circumstances. The sharing rules vary across villages. In Dokur, where the use of 
purchased inputs is fairly high, more than 90% of the contracts stipulate 50-50 output 
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less intensive, the tenant is responsible for supplying all inputs and receives a share of 
50-75% of the output.  2)  Tenancy contracts are flexible and renegotiations based on 
midseason production contingencies are common. In cases of failure to supply for 
inputs, there are renegotiations and readjustments. 3) Tenancy contracts can be 
interlinked across other factors and product markets and though not prevalent, 
interlinked contracts comprised of 12 percent of tenancy transactions. 4) Tenants decide 
what crop to plant unless the owner provided a considerable quantity of purchased 
input. Fixed rental, sharecropping and owner operation also coexist in the same locality 
as explained by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). 5) Many tenancy arrangements improved 
the risk-bearing capacity of the landowner as risk was transferred to or shared by the 
tenant. Table 3.2 shows the risk implications of several tenancy arrangements. Walker 
and Jodha (1986) explain that about 60 percent of the tenancy transactions in the 
Sholapur villages from 1975/76 to 1978/79 had implications for intertemporal 
adjustment to risk. These transactions represented continuing attempts by farmers to 
adjust to resource losses. 
It has been argued by many economists that  sharecropping is essentially an 
inferior system to that of fixed-rent tenancy.  The basic idea behind it – if the effort of 
the tenant cannot be monitored and controlled by the landlord, the tenant has an 
incentive to undersupply his effort, because under sharecropping a part of the output 
produced by him gets siphoned off to the landlord.  Shaban (1987) compared the 
efficiency on share cropped land with efficiency on owned land after carefully controlling 
for other factors that affect yields.  The main result being that output and input 
intensities per acre are higher on the owned plots.  The average difference is 33% for 
output and 19-55% for inputs.  Why then does sharecropping still exist? It is the 
dominant form of tenancy in the ICRISAT villages.  It exists and is rampant because 
sharecropping emerges as a way to share, not just the output, but also the risk that is 
associated with the production.  When a tenant pays a fixed rent, he is forced to bear 
the entire uncertainty of production.  While under sharecropping, he is able to pass on 
some of this uncertainty to the landlord by varying the rent payable with the size of the 
output.  As tenants are risk averse and they do not have perfect access to credit or 
insurance markets, therefore, landlords can make money by attempting to insure them 
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11  But in doing so, the landlord must offer contracts that 
induce the right incentives.  Besides, these contractual relationships may have 
implications for other kinds of landlord-tenant behavior, such as the provision of credit 
to the tenant, the tendency to evict tenants and the incentives to make long run 
improvements on the land. 
Another potential strategy that agricultural households can adopt to smooth 
production shocks is to hold spatially scattered plots. Land fragmentation is synonymous 
with a spatially dispersed farm holding in which land held by an individual is scattered  
in plots separated by land in the possession of others (Royal Commission on Agriculture 
1928, as cited by Roy 1983). In the Walker and Ryan study of the ICRISAT villages, risk 
reduction was indeed alluded to as a beneficial consequence of land fragmentation. 
They explain that holding several spatially dispersed parcels was often associated with 
greater opportunities to exploit soil variation within the village. They further write that, 
farmers believed that some crops could be profitably grown only on some soils in the 
village; hence access to soil variation through fragmentation encourages crop 
diversification, which in turn facilitates resource adjustment as seasonal input demands 
vary by crop. Nevertheless, more than 40 percent of the households in their study felt 
no benefits were derived from spatially dispersed holdings. In general, farmers who 
owned more than one parcel felt that the costs of land fragmentation outweighed the 
benefits. Among the several potential costs attached to owning and cultivating 
fragmented plots that Walker and Ryan (1990) discuss in detail, increased travel time 
and greater troubles in supervision of cropping operations were the prominent ones. 
This is not a surprising result because the premise on which benefits from fragmentation 
are expected is of spatial variation in the quality of land and topography. Such variation 
is usually lacking in India’s dry semi arid tropics and most likely explain why many 
farmers feel that spatial diversity is not highly conducive to risk reduction. Land 
fragmentation, therefore is not a prominent strategy adopted ex ante to smooth income 
variation. 
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Rural households can protect themselves from idiosyncratic income shocks in the labour 
market using both ex post strategies like shifting from own farm cultivation to the labour 
market or by increasing hours of work as well as ex ante measures like entering 
‘permanent’ labour contracts to avoid seasonal fluctuations in wages and employment 
opportunities.  The ability to smooth income directly reduces the need to resort to the 
depletion of assets or to costly ex ante measures.  The importance of labour income for 
Indian farm households increases the likelihood of the above responses.  In the ICRISAT 
village studies, the majority of farm households (70%) report labour earnings in the 
daily wage labour market, with total labour income amounting to 25% of total crop 
profits.  While almost all small farms (87.5%) report such income, so do a significant 
number of large farms (46.4%).   
To gauge the extent of (ex-post) smoothing that is done via labour market, we 
look at the regression results of Kochar (1995), which indicate that small negative crop 
shocks evoke significant increases in wage income – increased wage income allows 
small, medium and large farm households to compensate for 45%, 62% and 41% of 
small crop income shocks respectively.  Households are more vulnerable to large 
negative crop shocks, which are uncompensated through either wage income or 
informal borrowing.  The incidence of large crop shock is, however, relatively small.  
Though households are able to compensate for episodes of illness suffered during slack 
season, there is a significant loss of wage income associated with illness in the peak 
season, particularly illness of males.  Such shocks increase informal borrowing, and the 
fact that borrowing is resorted to only when increases in wage incomes are not feasible 
indicates the relative costliness of this strategy.  Constrained access to credit by small 
farmers in conjunction with their greater vulnerability to illness suggests that such 
shocks link income uncertainty to poverty to a greater degree than crop income shocks.   
Kochar’s (1995) analysis of household vulnerability to idiosyncratic income 
shocks reports two implications of the use of labour as insurance.  The first is that wage 
income will be ineffective as a source of insurance against shocks that affect the 
household’s valuation of labour, since it pools risk at the level of the household.  
Therefore demographic shocks and the dissolution of the family will require alternative 
and possibly costlier methods of insurance.  Such shocks can then affect the economic 
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shocks, in fact, contribute significantly to the variability of full income.  Rosenzweig’s 
(1988) estimates of full income, defined as the sum of crop profits and the income that 
would be earned by adult household males if each worked 312 days at the going wage 
rate, suggest that in the ICRISAT villages, variability in the household’s male labour 
endowment respectively contributed to 38%.  These figures understate the importance 
of demographic shocks, since no allowance is made to illness. These episodes appear to 
be frequent, with 39% households reporting loss of working days due to illness in a 
given year.  The study also indicated that the poor appear more vulnerable; while 28% 
of large farm households recorded an episode of illness, 43% of small farm households 
recorded such an episode. 
Another implication noted by Kochar is that the segmentation of labour markets 
by gender may make a household’s vulnerability to crop income shocks a function of its 
demographic composition, in particular the number of able-bodied males relative to 
females. As consequence of such a segmentation, it is easier for males to obtain 
employment on the daily-wage labour market than it is females.
12   
Kochar also looks at the extent to which  a household’s vulnerability to crop 
shocks depends on its demographic composition. Ability of a household to smooth crop 
shocks depends on its male labour endowment, with female members, in fact, 
detracting from this ability.  It is also seen that households that are relatively 
disadvantaged in the labour market are not able to compensate through the credit 
market.  An analysis of the demographic composition of households shows that small 
farms have fewer male workers than other farms, which makes them more vulnerable to 
crop income shocks.  Not much is known about the methods used by households to 
reduce their exposure to demographic shocks and the costs of the methods used.  While 
the short–run costs of using labour as insurance may be low relative to the use of credit, 
there may be substantial long-run costs.  Thus, in addition to possible effects on fertility, 
the household may maintain excess stocks of family labour at the cost of income-
increasing migration.  The use of labour as insurance may also lower educational 
attainment.
13 
Let’s now turn to the ex ante  strategies that households adopt to avoid seasonal 
fluctuations in wages and employment opportunities. Table 3.3 has data on seasonal 
  59 fluctuations in employment in the ICRISAT village for 1975-76. The data indicates huge 
fluctuations in employment rates between the peak and slack seasons. This fluctuation 
is especially acute for women. Households in such a situation would then like to enter 
into contracts that guarantee a stable income across the year. Perhaps the most 
extreme case of income smoothing through labour market activity is given by Bardhan’s 
(1983) analysis of ‘tied labour’.  His study takes on the notion that permanent labour 
contracts are inefficient relics of an age when slavery was condoned.  Such contracts 
involve long term relationships between employers and employees at steady but low 
wages.  Tied labour contracts account for roughly one-third of agricultural labour 
relationships in surveys of rural India and have been employed in a diverse set of 
agricultural economies.  The labour markets in India are by no means homogeneous or 
uniform; there are vastly different kinds of arrangements that can be seen.  As noted 
there are two kinds of hired labour- casual labour, hired on a daily basis sometimes 
weekly basis, and permanent workers or ‘tied’ labourers, who are on long term contracts 
that extend for months or even years.  Bardhan [1983] has proposed an explanation for 
the existence of permanent labour, based on the following idea.  Risk averse workers 
faced with an uncertain spot wage can engage in long term contracts with risk-neutral 
landlords for a pre-negotiated wage, albeit at a rate lower than the expected spot rate.  
The main comparative static result of this model explains the well-acknowledged 
empirical findings that the proportion of permanent workers is higher in tighter labour 
markets.  In addition, Bardhan [1979] makes the observation that permanent workers in 
Indian agriculture typically enjoy a significantly higher annual income, despite a lower 
daily wage, then casual workers.
14  Permanent workers get consumption loans as well as  
other patronage benefits while casual workers face a great deal of uncertainty on the 
labour market. 
 
3.7  Crop Management and Choice of Agricultural Investments   
So far we have considered ex-post strategies (asset sales, credit, participation in casual 
labour market) and ex-ante strategies (tenancy, “permanent” labour contracts) that 
farmers use to cope with risk.  Now we consider strategies that farmers can employ to 
directly modify the risks that they have to manage.  These are necessarily ex-ante 
strategies and work through the many choices that comprise crop management.   
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3.7a  Risk Attitudes and Perceptions 
Although it is often asserted that farmers are risk averse, rigorous evidence on this issue 
is hard to come by.  In a pioneering study that has since not been replicated in India, 
Binswanger (1980), conducted experiments with individuals in rural India with real 
monetary payoffs.  300 individuals were randomly picked from the six villages that 
formed the field subjects for the ICRISAT study.  Three-fourths of households in the 
ICRISAT sample were cultivator households while the others were landless labourers.  In 
his experiment, Binswanger offered the subjects the choice of lotteries with different 
payoffs.  From the choices made by the subjects, it is possible to infer their risk 
aversion.  While a detailed account of the methodology is beyond the scope of this 
study.  However, the basic idea is the following.  Suppose a farmer is offered a choice of 
Rs. 5 or a bet where the farmer either gets Rs. 0 or Rs. 10 with equal probability.  
Clearly, a farmer who opts for the former is more risk averse than the farmer who 
chooses the risky bet.  From analyzing the pattern of such choices, Binswanger found 
that most farmers in the ICRISAT villages were intermediate to moderately risk averse.  
As is expected, higher the stake, greater is the risk aversion. 
  Walker and Ryan (1990) emphasize the distinction between risk aversion 
(determined by innate preference characteristics) and risk perceptions (determined by 
how farmers process information).  They point to the example of in-well boring in the 
ICRISAT villages.  Drilling bores costs money and it pays off if the bores intercept water-
bearing fissures.  Otherwise, the expenditure is a loss to the farmer.  Thus, the decision 
of whether to drill in-well bores is risky.  Walker and Ryan quote an investigation by 
Engelhardt who found that the only statistical difference between the groups of farmers 
who planned to drill bore and those who did not plan to bore was the difference in their 
subjective probability of hitting water-bearing fissures.  On average, within the same 
watershed, the farmers who planned to drill were much more optimistic about the 
possibility of hitting water fissures than the farmers who did not plan to drill.  They 
conclude that differences in risk perception rather than in risk aversion was what that 
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3.7b  Investments and Technology adoption 
To understand whether farmer’s risk attitudes are a constraint for undertaking new 
investments and the adoption of new technologies, Lipton and Longhurst (1989) point 
out that although poor people often give uncertainty as a reason for delaying or refusing 
adoption, the effect of risk aversion is not straightforward.  In the semi-arid tropics, 
digging wells and purchasing fertilizer are two most risky cash-intensive decisions 
(Walker and Ryan (1990).  Whereas digging wells is risky because in the semi-arid 
watersheds, about 30% of dug wells are dry,  fertilizer is a costly input that pays off 
when plants face no moisture stress.  Binswanger et. al (1982), found that risk aversion 
did constrain a farmer’s decision to invest in dug wells, however, the direct effects of 
risk aversion on fertilizer use were found to be modest.    
This is mostly because of the divisibility of fertilizer inputs.  In the adoption 
literature, it is well known that risk aversion can constrain adoption of technology only if 
its fixed costs are substantial (Feder and O’Mara, 1981).  Otherwise, even the most risk-
averse farmer would be tempted to use a potentially remunerative technology on a small 
plot.  The fixed costs of dug wells are clearly more important than of using fertilizers.  
However, as the profitability of fertilizer use depends on access to irrigation, the indirect 
effect of risk aversion on fertilizer (which works through the dampening effect on 
irrigation investments) is sizeable.  This is consistent with Schluter’s (1974) findings 
from Gujarat that risk is a more serious constraint on smallholder’s adoption than access 
to credit for inputs in unirrigated areas but less serious in irrigated areas.   
Consistent with the Walker and Ryan emphasis on risk perception, Lipton and 
Longhurst suggest that much of the risk of adoption of new technologies and varieties 
comes about because small farmers are likely to know less about them than about 
traditional varieties and in particular about the resistance of new varieties to pest and 
disease.  Much of the fixed costs of adoption then are related to the fixed costs of 
learning about new technologies.   
 
3.7c  Crop Diversification 
World over, crop diversification is regarded as the most common and effective risk 
management strategy that is employed by farm households.  By spreading risks across 
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compensated by gains in another crop.  There are some limitations of this strategy 
however.  First, diversification is clearly a feasible strategy to the extent that crop risks 
are independent, however, if returns are strongly correlated across crops, the risks 
facing farmers are similar to covariate risks and crop diversification will not be effective 
in reducing producer risk.
16  Second, crop diversification calls for spreading resources 
across crops even when a particular crops offers higher average net returns than other 
crops.  Therefore, the price of diversification is the income foregone, on average, by not 
growing the must remunerative crop.  Third, if there are fixed costs in the cultivation of 
a particular crop, then there is a minimum efficient scale and that may conflict with the 
requirements of crop diversification.  Farmers with small holdings are likely to run into 
this constraint.     
  We look at some quantitative evidence about the prevalence of crop 
diversification as reported in the 54
th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS).  
Among other things, households were asked to report their principal crops ,up to a 
maximum of 5, in kharif and rabi.  Classification of farm households can then be 
according to the number of crops they cultivate.  In table 3.5, we tabulate, by farm size, 
the proportion of agricultural households in each category.  As expected, the extent of 
diversification increases with farm size except for the dip in the highest size category.   
  Crop diversification is, however, not determined by considerations of risk alone.  
This point comes about in an analysis of crop diversification data in the ICRISAT village 
studies (Walker and Ryan, 1990).  The determinants of crop diversification varied across 
and within the ICRISAT villages.  In Mahbubnagar and Akola regions, draft power 
availability was an important factor that explained the variation in crop diversification.  
Larger farms with more gross cropped area were more diversified than small farms.  
This was not so much because of the greater costs of diversification for small farmers 
but because of more profitable opportunities for diversification as well as higher costs of 
specialization for large farms.  As large farms hold more fields they can exploit location-
specific production opportunities and they also have greater access to credit to finance 
more input-intensive cropping activities.  At the same time, by diversifying crops and the 
cropping calendar, large farms are able to reduce peak season labour requirements.  In 
the Sholapur regions, resource endowments in the shape of draft power and land size 
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land quality and cropping-year conditions.  Irrigation usually leads to specialization 
because it enables farmers to grow high value crops.  In Mahbubnagar, this led farmers 
to grow paddy while limited well irrigation in dryland Akola and Sholapur led farmers to 
grow new crops such as wheat, chickpeas and other pulses.  
Although factors other than risk alone drive farm decisions about cropping 
patterns and diversification, crop diversification in the ICRISAT villages does stabilize 
crop income (Walker, Singh and Jodha, 1983).  Interestingly, crop diversification was 
three times more effective in stabilizing net returns in rainfall-assured Akola than in 
drought-prone Sholapur (Walker and Ryan, 1990).  Walker and Ryan attribute this to the 
fact that in Sholapur most crops are vulnerable to the same source of risk, namely 
drought, while the sources of yield risk are much less covariate in the Akola villages.   
 
3.7d Intercropping 
Intercropping systems is another way for farmers to manage yield risks (Bliss, 1976).  
Intercropping lowers yield risks because of (a) lower disease and insect pest incidence 
and (b) greater potential for yield compensation (Walker and Ryan, 1990).  The first 
effect operates presumably because intercropping interferes with the spread of pests 
given that their operation is specific to crop type.  However, as Walker and Ryan point 
out, this effect also is specific to location and cropping system and does not always 
work.  Yield compensation refers to a crop’s ability to take advantage of light, nutrients 
and soil moisture released by the other crops adversely affected by risk (Walker and 
Ryan, 1990).  Clearly, this is not possible in pure stands. 
  Walker and Ryan are, however, skeptical of the value of the contribution of 
intercropping as a risk management tool.  They report findings from Walker and Jodha 
(1986) about the covariances in yields between crops in the same field.  If intercropping 
reduces risk, the covariances should be negative or zero but should not be strongly 
positive.  However, they find that correlation between sorghum and pearl millet yields in 
the sorghum/pearl millet/pigeon pea cropping system in Aurepalle (an ICRISAT study 
village) was as high as +0.63.  Clearly, these crops are affected by the same sources of 
risk.  They report similar findings from other dry-land villages.  The assured rain-fed 
environment of Akola village offered more opportunities for risk reducing inter-cropping.  
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within the same field and thereby create a crop portfolio with compensating risks.  In 
general, however, they conclude that inter-cropping in dry-land ICRISAT villages is 
driven by other factors (principally resource endowments such as family size, livestock 
etc) rather than risk.   
  Although the risk reducing potential of inter-cropping in drought-prone areas 
might be limited, even in those areas, inter-cropping seems to help in avoiding complete 
crop failure.  In section 2.5, we discussed the analysis of Singh and Walker (1983) who 
examined the incidence of crop failure in 3805 plots in the 6 ICRISAT study villages.  
From their paper, we reproduce Table 3.6, which shows the incidence of crop failure of 
one or more of the components of intercrops and mixtures.  It shows that the 
probability that all crops failed was very low – from 0.01 in Akola to 0.03 in 
Mahbubnagar.  However, the probability of failure of any one component in the 
intercropping system was high – ranging from 0.14 in Akola to 0.39 in Sholapur.   
 
3.7e Production Flexibility and Information 
It has been long recognized that in situations of uncertainty, it can pay to delay 
decisions even when such delay is costly.  The idea is that when decisions commit the 
producer to certain fixed costs, then they cannot be reversed easily.  In such cases, it 
might be better for a producer to wait to receive more information and then depending 
on the information, the action is undertaken or a revised plan is set in motion.   
  Jodha (1981) sees production flexibility as integral to the practice of dryland 
farming.  When crop failure is foreseen, households begin salvaging byproducts and 
other low value operations that would not be worthwhile in normal years.  Typically, it 
also results in changes in cropping patterns as farmers focus their efforts on crops that 
have a greater chance in adverse weather circumstances.  Such flexibility is 
demonstrated by the farmers in the semi-arid tropics of India (Walker and Ryan, 1990).  
In the drought prone Sholapur region, post-rainy season cropping in October is more 
assured (in terms of yield risks) than rainy season cropping.  Farmer’s plans for rainy 
season are contingent on rainfall.  As a result, the relative importance of rainy and post-
rainy season cropping fluctuates from season to season.  In a “normal” rainfall years, 
rainy season crops account for about 40% of gross cropped area.  If rainfall is deficient, 
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kharif season crops is very variable.  However, while this is a source of output and price 
variability, the area variability is itself not a risk but a response to weather risk.
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  Another example of area variability given by Walker and Ryan is the substitution 
of sorghum by castor that is induced by the late arrival of monsoon in Aurepalle.  Late 
planted sorghum is susceptible to pests and so farmers prefer to plant castor.  The 
response to agro-climatic events is even stronger in Mahbubnagar because of the short 
window of about 2-4 days after the onset of monsoon that is available for planting.  
Figure 3.1 reproduced from Walker and Ryan compares the variation in planting date in 
drought-prone Aurepalle to the rainfall-assured village of Kanzara.  The sample standard 
deviation in planting date across the 10 years of the ICRISAT sample was about 15 days 
in Kanzara and only 6 days in Kanzara where the early season monsoon rainfall was 
usually sufficient.  
   Comparing the cropping decisions across low and high soil moisture years in the 
ICRISAT villages, Gadgil et. al (1988) find that low soil moisture leads farmers to reduce 
cropped area, increase inter-cropping, increase area to short-duration and low water-
requiring crops.  Thus, production flexibility is a key feature of farmers’ adjustments to 
weather risks.    
   
3.7f   Risk Reducing Inputs 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, the principal causes in yield risk in India are rainfall 
uncertainty and damage from pests and insects.  The two inputs that directly affect 
these variables are irrigation and pesticides and related chemicals.   
  The absence of moisture stress substantially reduces yield risk.  We saw this 
earlier in the discussion of the relative importance of yield and price risks (section 2.3).  
It was also seen in the analysis of the effect of resource endowments on crop failures 
(section 2.5).  Irrigation fundamentally alters the production possibility set of the 
producer.  New opportunities become available as a result of which irrigation usually 
alters the cropping pattern even in semi-arid tropics from subsistence dryland crops like 
jowar and bajra to high yielding varieties of paddy and wheat that thrive on assured 
water (Gulati and Kelley, 1999).  Thus, the dynamic impact of irrigation on farm 
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market risk.   
  The risk reducing potential of pesticides is documented in studies that are quoted 
in the National Commission of Agriculture (1976).  The picture of pesticide users by crop 
is provided in Table 3.7.   Pesticide and weedicide is most prevalent among growers of 
“other cash crops”.  This category includes cotton that is well known to be particularly 
susceptible to pests.  Vegetables and paddy are other crops that lead in the extent of 
pesticide use.  This picture is consistent with the evidence on the crop destination of 
pesticides that is tabulated in Table 3.8.  As can be seen the major markets for 
pesticides are cotton, paddy and vegetables.  About half of the pesticides demand 
comes from cotton even though it is grown on only 4-5% of cultivable area.  On the 
other hand, the pesticides market for coarse cereals is small even though more than 
50% of cultivable area is under these crops.  The reason is that these crops are 
primarily grown in dry lands.  In these conditions, with the forever threat of drought and 
rainfall deficiency, the application of costly pesticides is risky.  As such information is not 
available for earlier years, it is hard to know how the pesticide use has changed over 
years although from the growing market for pesticides (from 7000 metric tonnes in the 
early 1960s to more than 100,000 metric tonnes by the mid-1990s), one would surmise 
that pesticide use has increased.   
  Besides using risk-reducing inputs, risk averse farmers could also curtail the use 
of inputs that increase risk.  Bliss and Stern (1982) take up this issue in investigating 
production choices in the village of Palanpur, in Uttar Pradesh.  They find that fertilizer is 
a highly productive input in wheat cultivation, but the marginal product of fertilizer 
remains 3.5 times its price.  Farmers could substantially raise expected profits by 
increasing applications of fertilizer, but by using less fertilizer, investment losses are  
reduced in bad times.  The authors’ calculations suggest that the foregone expected 
profits are most plausibly explained by high levels of risk and risk aversion.  In Antle’s 
(1987) investigation of paddy producers in the ICRISAT village of Aurepalle, fertilizer 
was once again found to be a risk increasing input. 
 
  67 3.7g Investment Portfolio 
A study by Rosenzweig and Binswanger [1993] based on the ICRISAT data shows that 
the agricultural investments portfolio behaviour of farmers reflects risk aversion. This 
study is concerned with the role of assets in mitigating risk ex ante.  They examine how 
the composition of productive and non-productive asset holdings varies across farmers 
with different levels of wealth and across farmers facing different degrees of weather 
risk.  They find that large farmers typically hold riskier investment portfolios than small 
farmers.  This feature arising from the evident willingness of wealthier farmers to absorb 
significantly more risk while reaping the higher average returns than less wealthy 
farmers, is evidence against the common supposition that smaller farms are always 
more efficient than larger farms, a presumption that ignores the returns to agricultural 
investment holdings.  Thus, uninsured weather risk is a significant cause of lower 
efficiency and lower average income for small farmers – a one standard deviation 
decrease in weather risk would raise average profits by 35% among farmers in the 
lowest wealth quartile as lower risk enables them to shift their portfolio to high-return 
investments.  These results suggest that improvements in the abilities of farmers to 
smooth consumption, perhaps via increased consumption credit, would increase the 
overall profitability of agricultural investments; similarly the availability of rain insurance 
would both raise overall profits in high risk areas and decrease earnings inequality within 
such areas.  However, the study by Rosenzweig and Binswanger finds that demand for 
rainfall insurance might be quite weak.  First, a substantial proportion of profit risk is 
idiosyncratic and well diffused.  Second, demand for weather insurance would come 
primarily, if not exclusively, from poor farmers.  Wealthy farmers are evidently unwilling 
to pay a premium, via reduced average profits, to reduce their exposure to ex ante 
weather risks. 
 
3.8   Hierarchy of Responses 
Of the ex-post strategies available to combat risk, the household does not treat them all 
equally.  Rather it has been seen that options such as the sale of assets are used only 
when the crisis is grave and when other options are ineffective.  There is thus a 
hierarchy of risk management strategies and the farm household usually begins with 
strategies at the bottom of the hierarchy.  A description of the hierarchy is provided by 
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famine.  The sequence of household responses to risk proceeds as follows. 
(a)  When crop failure is foreseen, the household undertakes supplementary operations 
such as collection of normally wasted products such as bushes and rough fodder for 
fodder and fuel.  In addition, the households undertake additional effort to minimize 
waste such as processing of stalk for animal feed, collecting every piece of dung  and 
other low value activities that would not be worthwhile in normal years.   
(b)  Households curtail current consumption.  Examples of such strategies are non-
milking of wet animals to permit adequate milk for young calves, higher priority for feed 
and fodder in purchases, inclusion of items like gur and oil (which disappear from 
human diet) in the feed for needy animals. 
(c)  Households dispose off inventories of stored items such as fuelwood, dung cakes, 
ghee, pickles and dried vegetables, and timber. 
(d)  Households mortgage and sometimes sell their assets.  Farmers prefer the 
mortgage of unproductive assets.  With respect to livestock, sale is preferred to 
mortgage because of the need to take care of the mortgaged animal. 
(e)  The final option is to migrate to other areas.  Jodha distinguishes four kinds of 
migration: (i) farmers move out to irrigated areas or areas unaffected by drought to 
work with their own bullocks and labour as share-croppers (ii) farmers with their 
bullocks go to towns to engage in transport activity (iii) youngsters move to irrigated 
areas as gang labour during the seasons of peak labour demand and (iv) farmers 
migrate with their animals to other states where pasture is available.  During the time of 
Jodha’s analysis (1963-64), the fourth migration was most important.  With the decline 
of common property resources, it is doubtful if that would continue to be the case. 
  Jodha’s analysis points to the fact that farmer behavior in the face of severe 
adversity is primarily to protect their assets and their means of livelihood.  His analysis 
also shows that farmer responses are dictated by the nature of their integrated 
enterprises containing field crop cultivation as well as animal husbandry.  This leads 
farmers to be concerned not merely about grain production but overall biomass and 
stability (Jodha, 1991).  Hence the importance in traditional risk-coping of perennial 
vegetation – of grass, shrub and trees.  They are less sensitive to rainfall fluctuations 
than field crops and their output is non-covariate with that of annual crops.  The 
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availability into economic gain.  These traditional strategies are endangered because of 
new crops and technologies, which neglect fodder requirements, and also because of 
decline in fodder-fuel producing resources such as common property resources.  Jodha 
(1991) also points out that the mobility of livestock endows it with a greater capacity 
(compared to immobile field crops) to respond to spatial variability of rainfall.  But as 
noted earlier, the decline of common property resources has severely compromised the 
role of livestock migrations in buffering the shock of crop failure.   
 
3.9    Conclusions 
Uncertainties in income within agriculture can arise from several sources and a farm 
household adopts different strategies to mitigate this risk, and smooth income and 
consumption.  There are essentially six ex post ways to compensate for shortfalls in 
farm income: They can sell stored produce, liquidate assets, borrow for consumption, 
receive transfers from relatives, change jobs and/or increase their labour market 
participation and migrate in search of work.  In their choices, farm households will try to 
protect their assets so as to minimize the adverse impact on their future livelihoods.  If a 
risk averse household is not able to achieve an entirely smooth consumption path 
through ex post mechanisms such as these, it has an incentive to devote resources in an 
effort to secure a more stable income stream.  Households might farm a diversified 
portfolio of land, adopt technologies such as inter-cropping or drought- resistant crops 
and contractual arrangements such as sharecropping that reduce the variance of 
income, or diversify their activities through migration or local non-agricultural 
employment.  Any of these ex ante actions might be costly, so that the households 
would be sacrificing income, on average, in order to assure a less risky stream of 
income.  We have analyzed all likely strategies that a farm household adopts to cope 
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Table 3.1. Tenancy in ICRISAT villages by household 
 






Aurapalle 406  90.7  1.2  8.1  0.0 
Dokur 220  82.3  15.9  0.9  0.9 
Shirapur 437  69.1  30.4  0.5  0.0 
Kalman 296  68.6  30.7  0.7  0.0 
Kanzara 320  80.6  11.0  5.3  3.1 
Kinkheda 187  85.0  14.5  0.0  0.5 
Boriya 186  56.5  29.0  12.9  1.6 
Rampura 216  76.4  14.8  5.6  3.2 
All 2,268  76.8  18.2 4.1  1.0 





Table 3.2. Risk implications of tenancy arrangements in the Sholapur villages, 
1975 to 1978 
 
Tenancy Arrangement (N farms)  Risk Implications 
Rent essentially fixed but subject to 
harvest (1) 
Implicit risk sharing 
Rent fixed, independent of harvest (2)  Risk transfer to tenant 
Advance loan, rent subject to harvest (2)  Implicit risk sharing; risk/loss management 
Input and output sharing (14)  Explicit risk sharing  
Input (excluding bullock) and output 
sharing (29) 
Explicit risk sharing; risk/loss management 
Input and output sharing with adjustable 
advance loan (30) 
Explicit risk sharing; risk/loss management 
Net output sharing (19)  Risk transfer to tenant 
Net output sharing with adjustable 
advance loan (17) 
Risk transfer to tenant; risk/loss 
management 
Risky plot tenancy with no fixed rental, no 
advance loan, meager crop share (19) 
Implicit risk sharing 
Mid-season leasing with share in output(9)  Risk transfer to tenant 
Land lease linked to labour and credit 
contracts (22)  
Explicit risk sharing; risk/loss management 
Source: Walker and Jodha [1986, Table 2.6]
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                                                       Unemployment rate (%) 
 Peak  Slack  Total 
Men  12 39 19 
Women  11 50 23 




Table 3.4. Proportions of tied labourers in ICRISAT villages  
 














Source: Pal [1993] 
 
 
Table 3.5.  Crop Diversification in Kharif and Rabi in 1999/00 
Source:  Our calculations from the 54












of crops in 
portfolio 
(Rabi) 
Marginal farms  >0 but <=1  1.230522  1.581382 
Small farms  >1 but<=2  1.540505  1.824489 
Small-Medium 
Farms  >2 but <=4  1.732585  1.916738 
Medium farms  >4 but<=10  1.885877  2.039622 




  73 Table 3.6.   Incidence of crop failure of main components in intercrops & 
mixtures from 1975-76 to 1977-78 
   




Mahbubnagar Sholapur  Aloka 
First  crop  only  1.2 5.1 1.8 
Second crop only  6.5 15.0  3.9 
Third crop only  7.1 3.9 4.9 
First & second crops  1.2  8.8  1.4 
Second & third crop  8.9  2.8  1.1 
First & third crops  0.6  0.8  0.0 
All three crops  3.0  2.6  1.1 
 
*Ranking of the components in intercrops & mixtures is based on relative area occupied by each 
species 
 
Source:  Singh and Walker (1983) 
 
  74 Table 3.7.  Pesticide and Weedicide Use in Indian Agriculture, 1999/2000 
 








Paddy 46.82  20.35 
Wheat 32.99  17.51 
Other cereal  29.17  11.14 
Pulses 29.81  9.44 
Oil seeds  36.30  14.39 
Mixed crop  29.00  9.21 
Sugar cane  38.67  20.47 
Vegetables 45.31  14.33 
Fodder 23.92  12.74 
Fruits & nuts  30.47  10.16 











Source:  Our calculations using the 54
th round survey of the NSS 
 
Table 3.8 Composition of Pesticides Market 









Coarse Grains  5% 
Source:  Interview with S. Jeyaraj, Professor of Entomology, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, 
Bulletin Board of Centre for Indian Knowledge Systems, www.ciks.org
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4.1. Introduction   
In the last chapter, we saw how Indian farmers typically manage and cope with risk.  
The strategies that we discussed were those that are employed by individual 
households.  In addition to these mechanisms, the need to cope with risk can also affect 
community interactions and social customs.  Gift-based exchange that is based on 
reciprocity and informal borrowing and lending on implicit and flexible terms are 
instances of community level mechanisms that can help farm households to cope with 
adversity.   
Anthropologists typically stress the value of social customs such as gift giving in 
securing the social status of the giver within the local social structure.  In contrast, 
economists tend to emphasize the gift-giving social norms as mechanisms for 
community insurance.  In developing countries like India, broad-based formal insurance 
markets are hindered by problems of imperfect information and costly enforcement.
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However, these problems are limited in small communities.  Villagers tend to know a 
great deal about what their neighbours are up to, and they can fall back on ‘informal’ 
enforcement mechanisms like social sanctions when disputes arise. 
The focus of this chapter is income smoothing attained through mutual insurance 
between economic agents.  The mechanisms involved might be gifts, transfers or 
borrowing and lending.  However, all mutual insurance scheme share the element of 
reciprocity.  If household A receives a gift or loan when it is in need, then in good times, 
this household might be called upon to lend or give gifts and transfers  (although not 
necessarily to the same donor agents from which it received transfers).  For mutual 
insurance to work, it must be that if some farmers are worse off in a particular year, 
then there must be other farmers in the risk pooling group that are better off.  In other 
words, there must be a certain absence of positive correlation between the fortunes of 
the participating agents.  This is the reason why mutual insurance is difficult: agriculture 
does present large correlations because of the weather.  If it is a bad year for all 
households in the community, then clearly there is no household that can share its good 
fortune with the less fortunate.  On the other hand, there are situations that are 
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benefit from mutual insurance.   
 
4.2. Mechanisms of Community Insurance: Informal Credit 
Reciprocal exchange is subject to many  enforcement problems.  A household that 
receives a loan may decline to repay later or may repay only meager amounts.   
Likewise, households experiencing relative prosperity may refuse to help out their 
neighbours who are in need. How does the community, then ensure that its members 
meet the obligations of reciprocal insurance?  Very often the obligations are themselves 
social norms and violating them would invite censure and possibly ostracization.  Formal 
insurance markets are governed by laws rather than social norms.  However, even here, 
often the most effective punishment for default is denial of service for future 
transactions.   
A study of rural credit markets in villages of northern Nigeria by Udry (1993, 
1994) provides a rich empirical illustration of institutional adaptation to problems of 
enforcement or missing information.  He shows credit flows between the village 
members is essentially in the nature of insurance and is contingent on the circumstances 
and needs of borrowers and lenders. The evidence shows that it is part of the norm that 
the repayment burden is reduced or excused for those borrowers who run into financial 
trouble: proof of the insurance aspect of these transactions.  Because lending is 
restricted between closely knit communities, borrowers usually find it impossible to 
misrepresent their true financial situation or to feign crop damage, illness or any other 
misfortune quite unlike formal credit contracts where the lender would be reluctant to 
reschedule payments because of the absence of credible information of the borrower’s 
circumstances.  In the few cases of dispute and perceived default, Udry observed that a 
complaint is made to the community leader or village head by the lender. If, after review 
of the situation, the leader holds the borrower to be guilty, the punishment imposed is 
usually a verbal admonition and, in extreme cases, a threat to make the matter public. 
However, Udry’s analysis also highlights the limitations of community insurance.  
As will be explained in more detail in the next section, a shock to income can be of two 
types: an idiosyncratic shock, which affects a single household (e.g. an illness in the 
family, flooding or insect damage to the family’s plot etc), and an aggregate shock, 
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etc). Because most borrowing and lending is restricted to small communities and 
villages, the rural credit market should be efficient in pooling risk and providing 
insurance against the first kind of shock, but not against the second. Udry estimated 
that in his sample, about half (58%) of the variation in farm yields was caused by 
aggregate shocks, so this limitation must be serious.  
Ravi’s (2002) survey of some Indian villages in Uttar Pradesh and Kerala also 
reports similar norms as mentioned in Udry’s account of northern Nigeria.
19   Lending 
within the Muslim villages of Kannauj is interest free. There are, however, a wide variety 
of fixed costs that the lenders impose on the borrower depending on the financial 
situation of the borrower and lender. Though not formally analyzed by economists, we 
are aware of several social institutions, cultural norms and networks that exist in rural 
India, which perform the roles of coordination and enforcement to facilitate mutual 
insurance. 
 
4.3  Mechanisms of Informal Insurance: Patronage  
A patron-client relationship such as jajmani  system in northern India traditionally 
involves a set of reciprocal but asymmetrical obligations between patrons and clients 
(Agarwal, 1990).  The obligation of the clients was to provide labour, rent or services.  
In return, the patron was obliged to provide a fixed payment usually in kind and to take 
care of the client in times of extreme need (illness, marriage etc).  Clearly, such 
patronage systems provided some protection against seasonal and annual shortages.  
However, patronage systems are on the decline because landlords are able to obtain 
cheaper labour from the casual labour market.  Similarly, the option of migration to 
urban areas has reduced the supply of clients.  Agarwal cites a table from Jodha that 
compares the prevalence of patron-client support between 1963-64 and in 1982-84.  
This is reproduced here as Table 4.1.  The data unambiguously show a decline in 
patron-client relationships.   
 
4.4  Mechanisms of Informal Insurance:  Kinship and Friendship 
We have already seen how social relationships can sustain informal credit markets.  
Agarwal (1990) draws attention to the role of kinship networks in sharing, lending and 
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agricultural implements and machinery.  Women’s networks exchange small amounts of 
foodstuffs, fuel and fodder.  Traditional support systems draw strength from caste 
groupings.  Aggarwal claims that women’s networks established through marriage 
alliances and complex reciprocal gift-giving play an instrument role in sustaining social 
relationships.   
   A recent study by R. Murgai et al (2002), analyzes water transfers data from 
Punjab, Pakistan where water delivery is subject to idiosyncratic random shocks. They 
show that households cope with variability by exchanging water bilaterally with 
neighbours and family members, and also with members of tightly knit clusters. Their 
work finds the relevance of kinship as an organizing principle for self selected clusters. 
Risk sharing takes place preferentially in social arenas that facilitate rapid information 
flows, impose norms of fairness and reciprocity, and apply social sanctions on defaulting 
parties. These functions of local institutions are non-trivial because they solve inherent 
problems of coordination, asymmetric information, and contract enforcement that can 
be prohibitively costly for outsiders to solve.  
  There is some evidence from work by social scientists that traditional forms of 
support whether from family or from friends are eroding.  These are especially 
connected with the breakdown of marriage (for women) and old age (Agarwal, 1990).   
 
4.5  Mechanisms of Informal Insurance: Communal Resources  
Another mechanism adopted by rural communities to smooth shocks to income is to 
draw upon common resources.  Poor agricultural households typically obtain their 
incomes from a wide variety of sources.  In particular, apart from field crops and 
vegetables, they also keep livestock, poultry and collect and sell products from common 
resources such as fruits, honey, fuelwood (Agarwal, 1990; Jodha, 1975).  Agarwal points 
out that “access to village common property resources (CPRs) and state forest plays a 
critical role in enabling poor rural households to obtain essential items for daily use, to 
diversify income sources, and to increase the viability and stability of traditional farming 
systems by allowing a more integrated and diversified production strategy involving 
crops, trees, livestock etc.”   
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(Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu) shows that while all rural households use CPRs in some degree, CPRs play 
a bigger role in the life of the poor.  In most districts, the poor derive more than 20% of 
their income from CPRs.  In other districts, the contribution of CPRs ranges between 9-
12%.   The poor depend on CPRs especially for fodder and fuelwood.  The latter is still 
the primary source of fuel for cooking in rural India.  In semi-arid regions, CPRs provide 
90-100 percent of firewood, 66-84 percent of all domestic fuel, and 69-89 percent of the 
grazing needs of the landless and small farmers (Agarwal,1990).   
CPRs are particularly useful in the slack season.  Agarwal (1990) quotes a study 
which estimates that among tribals in central India, gathered food provides 12% of 
energy intake during normal pre-harvest seasonal shortages compared with two percent 
in the post-harvest period.  In a survey of arid and semi-arid districts, Jodha (1986) 
found the employment from CPRs to be more important than own farm employment.  
What is more CPR collections reduced the person days of unemployment  by 30%.   
Jodha’s study also shows that CPRs have declined since the early 1950s.  The 
area of CPR lands declined by 26-52% (depending on region) between 1950-52 and 
1982-84.  Correspondingly their role in supporting the livelihood of poor rural 
households and in cushioning the risks from dryland farming must have reduced as well.  
The main reason for the loss of CPRs is the privatization of these lands either because of 
illegal appropriation or because they were distributed to individual households under 
various welfare programmes.  Jodha (1991) believes that the deterioration in CPRs is 
one element in a general erosion of social sanctions and norms that governed collective 
sharing arrangements.  He attributes this to several factors: introduction of formal 
institutions & the legal and administrative framework which often took no account of 
traditional customary arrangements, individualism stemming from market forces and 
population pressures that led to encroachment of CPRs.  The dissolving of collective risk 
adjustment devices means that farmers today are more dependent on their individual 
efforts and on public relief measures for support in times of adversity. 
Common resources are not always physical but can also be financial resources, 
which are mostly micro-finance projects.  They are schemes like ‘Kudumbashree’
20 in 
several districts of Kerala, which are essentially revolving credit and savings societies, 
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who periodically contribute to a fund, which is earmarked to each member by lot or by 
auction.  Loans are also advanced to members from the fund if need arises.  There is a 
novel project known as ‘Gram Vikas Kosh’ run by Seva Mandir, a Non Government 
Organization in Udaipur, Rajasthan.  This is a project aimed at building corpus funds at 
the village level.  It is also a  platform, which a village can gather around and use for 
deliberation and action towards self-managed development. These are also projects 
aimed at building social capital within the communities, which will then lead to better 
coordination and enforcement of mutual insurance mechanisms. The role of outside 
agents to help build community social capital beyond local descent groups has been 
explored by the World Bank [1997], Durston [1999], and Abraham and Platteau [2001]. 
While there is no single solution, and the time dimension can be substantial, key 
elements of this undertaking include the rediscovery of ancestral norms of reciprocity in 
the community, the training of community members in basic principles of governance of 
local organizations, and the provision of new opportunities to derive short-term material 
benefits from the use of social capital. 
 
4.6.  Risk Pooling and Perfect Mutual Insurance 
As discussed in section 2.1, a farmer’s risk can be considered to consist of two 
components: a systemic or common risk that affects all members of the community and 
an individual or idiosyncratic risk that is particular to that farmer.  Examples of the 
former are weather risks.  Examples of the latter are local pest infestations and illness.   
The maximum insurance that can be achieved by risk pooling is to completely insure the 
idiosyncratic component of a farmer’s income.  This situation is known as perfect 
insurance.  This makes sense because common shocks affect all members of the 
community and therefore risk pooling within the community is not capable of achieving 
insurance against the common systemic risks.   
Note that perfect insurance does not imply that a farmer’s income is completely 
stable.  What it implies is that all fluctuations in a farmer’s income is entirely because of 
the common systemic risks and not because of individual specific idiosyncratic risks.  It 
follows that one can examine the existence and effectiveness of mutual insurance by 
looking at how the consumption of households varies with idiosyncratic shocks.  If the 
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households within the community should be invariant to idiosyncratic shocks and move 
only with common systemic shocks.  In practical terms, perfect insurance means while 
consumption of households will vary with common misfortunes such as drought (and 
also good fortunes), it will be invariant to individual misfortune.   Thus, community risk 
pooling should lead individual consumption to be more closely related to aggregate 
village consumption than to individual income.   
Researchers have used this idea to examine the extent of risk pooling within the 
ICRISAT villages.  Townsend (1994) followed by Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) found 
that while a household’s marginal propensity to consume out of household income is 
positive (and not zero as would be in a situation of perfect insurance) it was not large 
(0.14 in Townsend and between 0.12 and 0.46 in Ravallion and Chaudhuri).    These 
results suggest that informal insurance exists, but it is not nearly perfect.  By 
disaggregating villages by agricultural status Morduch (1994) finds that for large scale 
and medium scale farmers idiosyncratic shocks are better smoothed than for small-scale 
farmers and landless labourers.  On investigating borrowing constraints, he finds that 
food consumption growth for the latter two groups is affected by idiosyncratic shocks, 
while such shocks do not affect larger scale farm households. 
   Among a growing number of empirical studies conducted on this question, 
ICRISAT villages do relatively well in exhibiting a great deal of consumption smoothing 
although the ability to smooth may vary significantly across households.  Using a 
somewhat different test for insurance, Morduch (1995) found substantial evidence of 
consumption smoothing among relatively better-off farmers, but not so for small farmers 
and landless labourers.  This study also made a point that insurance might look good 
simply because households try to smooth their income streams so that the remaining 
fluctuations can be absorbed by the available consumption smoothing mechanisms.  
Some households, for instance, may forego the cultivation of a crop with high expected 
return simply because the yield is more risky and cannot be smoothed through 
insurance. Thus the household chooses a ‘safer’ crop and its income fluctuations are 
therefore smaller and consequently easier to smooth.  The crux of the matter being that 
there is a hidden cost, therefore, “for less well off households in the ICRISAT villages, 
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will happen in the first place.” 
Subsequent work with more elaborate models and alternative data have mainly 
rejected the full-risk sharing model.  Inspired by Townsend’s work, some researchers 
have turned to identifying constraints that keep the full risk sharing model form holding.  
There are mainly two such constraints - information asymmetries and enforcement 
problems. The newer work strengthens arguments for moving away from the village as 
the “natural” level at which to organize informal insurance.  In recent work that draws 
inspiration from the ICRISAT studies, for example, Genicot and Ray (2003) show that 
due to imperfect enforceability of contracts, stable insurance groups at levels below or 
above the village level can exist even when village level arrangements break down.  The 
arguments for this, hinge on the changing benefits of risk pooling under self enforcing 
insurance arrangements rather than exogenous costs to group formation. There are 
trade-offs between the benefits of pooling risks with people versus the tendency for 
larger groups to sub-divide into smaller coalitions; they show that the stability of 
coalitions is highly non-linear as their size changes. This has prompted research that 
looks beyond village level arrangements. 
A recent work by Morduch (2002) examines whether failure of the village level 
tests belies substantial risk- sharing within families or within members of a village 
subgroup such as a caste group.  This work considers tests for group where communal 
insurance seems more likely, relative to mutual insurance of the entire village.  The 
theory described above implies that if complete village-level insurance exists, the finding 
should be replicated exactly when investigating the behaviour of any sub-group.  
Morduch’s results by caste provide evidence that food consumption, but not total 
consumption, appeared to be well- insured for some castes, suggesting that the right 
model may be one where neighbours insure each other against dire events but are left 
to cope individually in the face of minor shocks.  In Aurepalle and Kanzara (ICRISAT 
villages), the tests suggest that the highest ranked caste appear to be better “insured” 
than others.  The castes classified as being of lower status show signs of weaker 
“insurance” systems.   
As against previous studies, which have considered changes in consumption, 
Jacoby and Skoufias (1998)  consider decisions about the enrollment of children in 
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idiosyncratic income shocks? To get adequate variation, they consider seasonal data.  
Their innovation in this paper is to use seasonal data on rainfall to disaggregate shocks 
both as idiosyncratic vs. aggregate and as anticipated vs. unanticipated.  Rainfall data 
being predictable provides a basis for distinguishing between credit market failure and 
insurance failure.  Insurance failure is detected by seeing responses to idiosyncratic 
shocks, both anticipated and unanticipated, while self-insurance failure is detected by 
seeing responses to anticipated shocks, whether idiosyncratic or not. They reject both 
perfect insurance and perfect credit market, especially for smaller farmers. The main 
result of their work being that school enrollments respond to risk. 
The consensus from all these empirical studies is that although there is mutual 
insurance within these communities the risk pooling is not perfect.  Idiosyncratic shocks 




Rural households in India use a wide variety of instruments to smooth consumption 
some through market and some through informal mechanisms, as recent research 
indicate. The ICRISAT studies show that village level risk sharing is able to mitigate a 
large portion of idiosyncratic risk. Some idiosyncratic risk, however, remains and  poorer 
households are considerably more vulnerable than richer households.  Furthermore, 
what is disturbing is that risk pooling at the level of village seems weaker than by caste 
and kinship groups.  Recent academic work on incomplete risk sharing has focused on 
the role of imperfect enforcement in explaining the lack of full risk sharing.  Enforcement 
problems are key part of the economic environment in the ICRISAT study region, but 
they are insufficient to explain the patterns in the data.  Most important, evidence of 
incomplete risk sharing may result as well from imperfect information, heterogeneity in 
desires and ability to save and borrow, specification error, costly contracting, and a host 
of other social factors. The decline of patron-client relationships, kinship and friendship 
relations and of common property resources all which are important elements of 
collective sustenance arrangements in village India suggests that traditional 
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at the time of independence.   
  85 Table 4.1  Decline in Patron-Client Relationships in Rajasthan 
Indicators  % of Households: 1963-66  % of Households, 1982-84. 
Households with one or 




Households residing on 
patron’s land/yard 
31 0 
Households resorting to off-
season borrowing of 
foodgrains from patrons 
77 26 
Households taking seed 
loans from patrons 
34 9 
Households marketing farm 
produce only through 
patrons 
86 23 
Households taking loans 
from others besides patrons 
13 47 
 
Source:  Jodha (1985) reproduced in Agarwal (1990) 
  86 Chapter 5:  Production Risks, Technological Change 
and Crop Insurance 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we consider how production risks have been transformed by 
developments in the agricultural economy in the post-independence period.  In 
technology, the momentous events was the introduction of improved seeds in the mid-
1960s that marked the “green revolution”.  Since then, agricultural growth in India has 
been sustained by technological change.  As is well known, the crucial developments 
were in plant breeding.  Since the 1960s, the Indian agricultural research system has 
released many improved varieties some of which have been widely adopted by farmers.  
The displacement of traditional varieties by improved varieties has changed production 
practices especially in terms of greater use of nutrients and pesticides.  The impact of 
improved varieties on production risks has been controversial.  At issue is the 
susceptibility of improved varieties, relative to traditional varieties, to moisture stress 
and pests.  Improved varieties do well in assured rainfed or irrigated environments.  As 
they are fertilizer responsive, vegetative growth is greater with improved varieties that 
in turn might encourage more pest attacks.  Does that mean, however, that improved 
varieties are riskier than traditional varieties? 
  In terms of managing risks, the earlier chapters discussed private and 
community responses.  In addition, there are government programs that could also 
assist farmers in coping with production risk.  The second part of this chapter 
documents the efforts of government in helping farmers manage production risks.   
 
5.2  Improved Varieties and Fertilizer Use 
The use of improved varieties is associated with an expanded use of fertilizers.  Indeed, 
the success of the semi-dwarf varieties of wheat and rice is because of their efficiency in 
converting added nutrients to grain matter in a way not possible with traditional 
varieties.  This has led to suggestions that improved varieties might be riskier than 
traditional varieties because while they outperform traditional varieties under optimal 
applications of fertilizers (which in turn is contingent on conducive weather conditions 
and water availability), they perform worse than traditional varieties under conditions of 
  87 low fertiliser use.  In their comprehensive review, however, Lipton and Longhurst (1989) 
show that the evidence on fertiliser response does not justify any kind of simple 
association between the higher yields of improved varieties and higher risk.    
From evidence on improved varieties in mostly Asia and including India, they 
point out that improved varieties often outperform traditional varieties even with zero 
fertilizer input.  The examples are drawn from maize, wheat, rice, sorghum and ragi 
millet (pp 44-45).  This does not mean, however, that farmers would adopt improved 
varieties when they cannot afford fertilizers.  The yield advantage of improved varieties 
is proportionally greater at higher inputs and so the farmer’s choice might very well be 
to either go with improved varieties with a concomitant use of fertilizers or to use 
traditional varieties with little or no use of fertilizers.  In such a case, the profit or 
income risk associated with the improved variety might very well be too forbidding for a 
poor farmer to adopt it.  However, in such instances, the non-adoption is due not to the 
higher risk of the modern variety but because of the absence of credit facilities which 
cannot support and cushion the risks of scaling up activity from a low-input subsistence 
to more input intensive cultivation.   
Lipton and Longhurst, however, point to an ecological risk that might arise with 
the continual expansion and adoption of improved varieties.  As improved varieties are 
typically more efficient in extracting soil nutrients than traditional varieties, fertilizers 
must be used to replenish the soil.  As a result, over the long run, the new technologies 
might lead to greater dependence on fertilizers and thus on the fossil fuels (oil and 
natural gas) that constitute the feedstock for inorganic fertilizers.   
 
5.3  Improved Varieties and Moisture Stress 
Some studies have claimed that improved varieties perform worse than traditional 
varieties under conditions of water deficiency.  If true, this would mean that improved 
varieties are riskier than traditional varieties in drought-prone areas.  Lipton and 
Longhurst (1989), however, dispute the existence of any kind of a uncomplicated 
relationship between moisture stress and improved varieties in general.  Indeed, the 
early improved varieties were less sensitive to moisture stress than traditional varieties 
because they matured earlier and thus were not dependent on late rains.  Lipton and 
Longhurst quote studies that show that given total water availability, the early improved 
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Among more recent varieties, Lipton and Longhurst cite the instance of CSH-I hybrid 
sorghum that by the late 1970s was successful in pushing up yields in dryland drought-
prone parts of India.   
  Inspite of these successes, traditional varieties still dominate in areas without 
assured rainfall or irrigation.  Lipton and Longhurst point out that moisture stress is itself 
a broad term and that the interaction between moisture stress and plant response is 
complicated and is not uniform between crops.  As a result, under the current state of 
technology, improved varieties have been successful in coping with moisture stress in 
some instances but not all.   
  Improved varieties might have an indirect impact on a farmer’s exposure to 
moisture stress because improved varieties of specific crops have in some instances 
become so successful that it has encouraged shifts towards crops that are sensitive to 
moisture stress.  For instance, while the improved varieties of wheat in North India have 
outperformed traditional varieties even under moisture stress, they have induced poor 
farmers to shift to them at the cost of more robust but lower yielding non-wheat crops 
(Lipton and Longhurst, 1989).   
 
5.4  Improved Varieties and Pests 
Resistance and tolerance to pests is usually incorporated in improved varieties.  
However, breeding strategies can fail or overlook some pests and diseases that are 
important in farmer’s fields.  In such cases, breeding strategies are revised as scientists 
look for varieties that confer resistance.  So it is not the case that improved varieties are 
less stable than traditional varieties in the face of a pest attack.  IR-20 rice that replaced 
traditional varieties in South India and Bangladesh was more resistant to all major rice 
pests and diseases (prior to a rice disease BPH) and lasted for about 15 years in 
farmer’s fields.  Similarly, Sonalika, an improved wheat variety had a life span of almost 
twenty years as it withstood rust attacks well enough to be popular in North India and 
neighbouring countries (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989). 
The continuous adaptation and evolution of pests means, however, that a 
successful pest resistance variety will have only a finite life.  Indeed, if the target pest 
evolves into a new more virulent pathogen then it poses a greater risk to farmers.  
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almost always more stable in face of pest attack than its predecessor variety (either the 
traditional variety or older improved variety), the set of improved varieties will probably 
in the long run prove less stable in the face of pest attack than its predecessor set.   The 
reason this happens is that the success of an improved variety leads all farmers to use it 
only.  But that reduces the genetic range in farmers’ fields and increases the likelihood 
of pest epidemics.  A single wheat variety, Sonalika, did so well in South Asia partly 
because of its rust resistance – so that by 1983 its susceptibility to a new race of leaf 
rust was a serious issue. 
  These considerations apply equally to genetically engineered varieties that 
incorporate pest toxins.  In 2002, the first approvals for genetically engineered plants 
were granted by the Indian government.  Approvals were given for commercial sales of 
three hybrid cotton varieties containing the Bt gene.  This gene, transferred from a soil 
bacteria, enables the plant to produce toxin against the American bollworm that is a 
serious cotton pest.  Results from field trials indicate that pest losses are much smaller 
for Bt cotton and that planting Bt cotton is a more efficacious and cost-effective pest 
management strategy than spraying pesticides.  In the long run, however, pest 
adaptation means that the pests will overcome the Bt strategy at some point.  The 
evolution of pest adaptation depends on the extent to which Bt cotton replaces non-Bt 
cotton.  For this reason, the use of Bt-cotton is contingent on the farmer planting some 
part of land (20%) to non-Bt cotton to provide refuge for the bollworm pests and to 
delay the evolution of Bt resistance. 
 
5.5  Improved Varieties and Riskiness of Net Returns 
In the earlier sections we discussed how improved varieties impact production risks.  
From the point of view of the farmer, however, what matters is the riskiness of net 
returns.  How does that vary between improved and traditional technologies?  This 
question has been addressed in the ICRISAT village studies (Walker and Ryan, 1990).   
  As net returns are random and vary according to the state of the world (pests, 
disease, weather) Walker and Ryan report the outcome of comparing the net returns 
from improved and traditional techniques for all states of the world captured within the 
10 year sample period.  Thus, the two techniques are compared for identical states of 
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groups: 
1.  Group 1:  Here the net return from improved techniques is higher than the net return 
from traditional techniques in every state of the world.  As a result, improved techniques 
are more profitable and less risky than traditional techniques.  Such cases pose no 
barriers to adoption.  The comparisons that met this test are:  
(a)  applying inorganic fertilizer to the cotton/pigeon pea intercrop in Kanzara during the 
rainy season Vs using no fertilizer  
(b)  improved fertilizer-responsive, irrigated paddy varieties sown in the rainy season in 
Aurepalle Vs local varieties. 
(c)  Inorganic fertilizer application to hybrid sorghum in Kanzara Vs no fertilizer 
(d)  cotton/mung bean intercrop in Kanzara compared to the traditional more extensive 
cotton pigeon pea/local sorghum intercropping system.   
2.  Group 2:  Here the net return from traditional techniques is higher than the net 
return from improved techniques in every state of the world.  In this case, farmer’s 
present practices dominate recommended techniques.  As a result, empirical instances 
that fit this case are hard to find because farmers would be irrational to adopt the 
improved techniques.  As an example of this case, Walker and Ryan suggest applying 
inorganic fertilizer to post-rainy season sorghum in Sholapur Vs no fertilizer.  With late 
planting date, crop yields are not responsive to fertilizers.   
3.  Group 3:  Here the net return from traditional technology is much better than the net 
return from improved technology in poor growing conditions that are relatively frequent.  
Examples are  
(a)  Cash-intensive hybrid cotton in dryland conditions of Kanzara Vs local cotton  
(b)  hybrid sorghum in Aurepalle Vs traditional sorghum/pearl millet/pulse intercrop   
4.  Group 4:  Here the net return from improved technology is higher than the net 
return from traditional technology in all states of the world except rare and extremely 
unfavourable conditions.  In such cases, unless farmers are extremely risk averse, they 
would choose the improved technology.  Examples are 
(a)  improved castor varieties Vs local varieties in Aurepalle. 
(b)  Planting improved paddy varieties with high fertilizer levels in post rainy season in 
Dokur or Aurepalle Vs local varieties at lower fertilizer levels.   
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world and lower in unfavourable states of the world where both the favourable and 
unfavourable states occur with about the same probability.  Here the choice of 
technology would depend on farmer’s risk aversion.  Examples are  
(a) Castor Vs traditional cereal/pulse intercrop (Aurepalle) 
(b) hybrid sorghum Vs local cotton intercropping systems (Kanzara) 
These investigations are inconclusive about the effects of improved technologies 
on farmer risk.  The results are contingent on particular crops, varieties and location.   
  
5.6  The Evidence on Aggregate Instability 
Researchers have found that aggregate foodgrains output as well as output of 
individual foodgrain crops has been more unstable during the period of improved 
varieties than in earlier periods (Mehra, 1981; Hazell, 1982, Ray, 1983).  Such a 
comparison is contained in Table 5.1 where it can be seen that the only exception is 
wheat.  The instability in aggregate foodgrains output varies by state (see Table 5.2).  
There is no readily understandable pattern in the variation of state-level instability.  In 
particular, there is no unique relationship between the degree of instability and growth 
rate of output (Rao, Ray and Subbaro, 1988).   
Rao, Ray and Subbarao find that foodgrains output in the post-green revolution 
period is more sensitive to rainfall than in the earlier period.  Their findings for 
foodgrains output as well as its individual components is summarized in Table 5.3.  Note 
that rabi output shows significantly lower variation than kharif output.  This is 
attributable to the more water assured production environments in rabi because of 
irrigation.  The same factor is reflected in the lower variation of wheat where much of it 
is grown under irrigated conditions.   
The instability in crop output is the outcome of instability in area and in yields.  
Table 5.4  compares the variation in area and in yields across the pre-green revolution 
and green revolution periods.  As can be seen, both area and yield have become more 
variable.  The variation in area reflects instability in area allocation as farmers react to 
relative crop advantages whether manifest in prices or production conditions.  Using 
methods similar to the decomposition of crop revenue risk into price and yield risk 
(section 2.3), Rao, Ray and Subbarao decompose the instability in crop output to 
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Clearly if area and yield are positively correlated, that would magnify output fluctuations 
compared to the case when they are negatively correlated.  The authors find that the 
relative contribution of correlated changes in area and yield has increased significantly in 
the post-green revolution period (Table 5.5).   
Rao, Ray and Subbarao also point to shifts in cropping patterns towards crops 
sensitive to rainfall and a shift in crop output regions towards locations vulnerable to 
rainfall as explanations for the higher rise in aggregate instability.  In the green 
revolution period, the share of rice in irrigated area recorded a significant decline from 
45% in 1960-61 to 32% in 1983-84 while the share of wheat rose sharply from 15 to 
38%.  As for locational shifts, the authors find that the emergence of new centres of 
growth in the western states (Maharashtra, Gujarat, MP, Rajasthan) that are historically 
more variable and the correlation between the outputs of western states and northern 
region to be the major factors in higher instability.   
The growing covariance between regions (presumably because of the dominance 
of similar improved varieties) as a factor in aggregate instability is also emphasized in 
Walker’s (1984) district-wise which showed that 95% of the increase in all-India 
aggregate production variance for jowar and 92% of the increase for bajra is due to 
higher covariance among the producing districts.  These proportions would be even 
higher at the farm level.  
There are no direct implications of the rise in aggregate instability for farm-level 
production.   First, as we have seen,  much of the higher output variability is because of 
greater covariances among crops and regions.  Second, in all analyses, instability is 
measured by coefficient of variation.  However, coefficient of variation can increase even 
when the output in the worst-scenario rises.  The latter is a more meaningful measure 
of extreme risks.  Lipton and Longhurst (1989) point out that even though the 
coefficient of variation of jowar and bajra output in semi-arid parts of South India rose 
with the successful adoption of improved varieties, the worst-case output also rose.  
These factors suggest that aggregate instability is not illuminating about farm-level 
production risks.  Indeed, it seems conceivable that the increase in aggregate instability 
in India has occurred inspite of a fall in farm-level instability.  Nonetheless, the rise in 
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comprehensive explanation. 
 
5.7  Output Stability and Irrigation 
As rainfall is a major source of production risk, irrigation has the potential of 
substantially reducing output variability.  Based on an analysis by Dhawan (1988), Rao, 
Ray and Subbarao (1988) report the findings from an exercise that compares instability 
between irrigated and unirrigated farming for 11 major states (Table 5.6).  For the 
group as a whole, irrigation has lowered the standard deviation in annual growth rates 
from 19 to 7.3% in the case of all crops; from 19.5% to 8.4% in the case of foodgrains 
output; from 14.5% to 5.9% in respect of overall crop yield and from 5 to 2.4% in 
respect of overall crop acreage.   
Similar trends are observed for individual states except Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh.  The authors believe that because these are high rainfall states, the stability 
grains from irrigation are limited.  The authors attribute the high gains in Punjab and 
Haryana to the extensive development of private tubewell irrigation in these states and 
the small gains in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh to the dependence in 
these states on tanks, which is highly sensitive to rainfall variations.   
Irrigation also contributes to drought-proofing the agricultural economy.  Table 
5.7, also from Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988), displays output reductions (from tend) in 
selected drought areas across irrigated and unirrigated areas.  The table also compares 
between these areas, the elasticity of output with respect to rainfall.  Measured either 
way, the table highlights the protective role of irrigation.   
  At a more disaggregated level, the risk reducing role of irrigation is contingent on 
the prevailing ecosystem.  Otherwise, the promotion of irrigation could actually 
exacerbate the effects of drought.  An instance of this is provided by Mehta’s (2000) 
study of Kutch.  Historically, Kutch is a drought-prone area.  Rainfall is erratic and 
variable and droughts take place every 2-3 years.  Before independence, the Kutch 
economy was predominantly dependent on livestock.  As grass growth is possible with 
just 112mm of rain, livestock activity was possible when agriculture was hazardous.  
Kutch also sits on an aquifer and so groundwater was a valuable resource in times of 
water scarcity.  With independence, the government promoted irrigation schemes and 
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water tables have been falling.  In Kutch, resource endowments are not conducive to 
intensive agriculture.  Without the buffer of groundwater resources, irrigation cannot 
succeed in stabilizing production when rainfall is deficient.   
 
5.8   Crop Insurance: Proposals and Pilot Schemes 
In earlier chapters, we saw how farmers used various strategies to manage risks.  
Perhaps, the most direct strategy would be for farmers to obtain insurance against these 
risks such as in crop insurance that provides insurance against production risks.   Crop 
insurance was considered by the central government as early in 1947-48.  However, the 
state governments did not support the proposal on account of its expense.  In 1965, the 
matter came up again and it met the same fate as on the earlier occasion.  The 
government constituted an expert committee headed by Professor Dharam Narain, the 
then Chairman, Agricultural Price Commission in 1970, which did not recommend the 
introduction of crop insurance because it felt the resources could be more productively 
deployed in increasing agricultural productivity.   
The official deliberations, however, threw light on the pros and cons of an 
`individual approach’ versus an `area approach’.  The former seeks to indemnify the 
farmer to the full extent of the losses and the premium to be paid by him is determined 
with reference to his own past yield and loss experience.   The ‘individual approach’ 
basis necessitates reliable and accurate data of crop yields of individual farmers for a 
sufficiently long period, for fixation of premium on actuarially sound basis.  In an area 
approach, farmers are compensated for losses according to an index of yield for a region 
to which they belong (e.g., village).  The latter yield is called the area yield.  The idea 
behind such insurance is that individual yields would be correlated with the area yield 
provided the area is reasonably homogenous.  Further, area yield data is more easily 
obtainable than individual yield data and is not subject to moral hazard in the same way 
as individual yields.  In an area approach, farmers within the same `homogenous area’  
pay the same rate of premium and receive the same benefits (as they are determined 
by the area yield relative to its average), irrespective of their individual fortunes. 
A beginning in crop insurance was finally made in 1972 by implementing an 
experimental scheme for Hybrid-4 cotton in few districts of Gujarat State.  This scheme 
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selected farmers.  It continued till 1979 when it was concluded that crop insurance 
schemes based on individual approach are not feasible and economically unviable to 
implement on large scale.  The major difficulty for implementing any scheme based on 
individual approach was to fix the guaranteed yield and the actuarially fair premium rate 
for each farmer for each crop and loss adjustment.   
Against this background, a new study was commissioned from Professor V. M. 
Dandekar by GIC.   Based on his recommendations, another pilot scheme but this time 
based on area insurance was introduced in 1979.  Participation in the scheme was 
voluntary but was open only to farmers who had received short term crop loans from 
financial institutions.  The scheme covered cereals, millets, oilseeds, cotton, potato and 
gram.  The premium for small and marginal farmers were subsidised to the extent of 
50%.  The liabilities were shared between the GIC and the State government in the ratio 
of 2:1 while the premium subsidy was equally shared by the state and central 
governments.  The pilot crop insurance scheme was implemented in 13 States till 1984-
85 and covered 6.27 lakh farmers for a premium of Rs. 196.95 lakhs against claims of 
157.05 lakhs. 
 
5.9 Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS)  
The pilot crop insurance scheme was replaced by a Comprehensive Crop Insurance 
Scheme (CCIS), which was introduced from April, 1985 by the Government of India with 
active participation of the State Governments.   The CCIS largely replicated the principal 
features of the pilot scheme but on a wider scale.  The difference was that CCIS was 
now mandatory for all farmers (growing the specified crops of cereals, millets and 
oilseeds).  Further, the premiums and claims were now split in the same ratio of 2:1 
between the central and state governments.  The premium rates were fixed at 2% for 
Cereals and Millets and 1% for Pulses and Oilseeds and the 50% premium subsidy 
continued.   
The Scheme was implemented by 19 States and 3 Union Territories (Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,  Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Delhi and 
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Majority of the claims were paid in the states of Gujarat - Rs. 1086 Crores (47%), 
Andhra Pradesh - Rs. 482 crores (21%), Maharashtra - Rs. 213 crores (9%) and Orissa - 
Rs. 181 crores (8%).  Among causes, drought was the chief cause, accounting for nearly 
75% of claims, followed by floods with 20%. 
The CCIS suffered from various problems.  Firstly, the scheme was voluntary  
leaving it to the option of the state governments to identify the crops and areas in which 
the scheme would operate.  This resulted in adverse selection of areas/states.  States 
like Punjab, Haryana and areas of Western Uttar Pradesh did not show any interest.  
Some states that participated initially, left the scheme in due course of time.  Thus, 
there was absence, of the basic canon of insurance business i.e., principle of cross 
subsidization with premia income from areas of stable crops paying for the areas having 
unstable crops in the scheme.  Secondly, there was no uniformity in the basic unit area 
of insurance (district, taluka, block etc.) for determining the threshold yield and 
assessment of actual yield in the calamity affected areas.  In a large unit areas (i.e. 
block, taluka or district) incidence of calamity is rarely uniform all over the unit area.  As 
a result, the relation of individual crop loss to insurance compensation becomes weak 
and therefore does not serve the purpose of reducing farm risk.  The success of area 
approach crop insurance depends upon the homogeneity of the unit area of insurance, 
which was not observed in all cases.  Thirdlly, the scheme was non-viable.  As against 
the premium income of  Rs. 402.83 crore, indemnities amounting to Rs. 2302.68 crore 
were paid during the period of 14 years of operation of CCIS resulting in a premia to 
claim ratio of 1 : 5.72.  This was because of unrealistically low premium rates in relation 
to the high incidence of natural calamities.  Fourthly, the scheme did not include many 
crops and many farmers.  The scheme was dominated by rainfed crops like oilseeds, 
millets and pulses and excluded cash crops.  Fifthly, the scheme was limited in its 
coverage of farmers as it included only farmers who take loans from financial 
institutions.  Lastly, the information base remained weak.  In particular, deficiencies in 
the system of crop cutting experiments were observed as a result of which the 
determination of area yield was not adequately supervised and monitored.   
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A new crop insurance scheme titled National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) was 
introduced in the country w.e.f. Rabi 1999-2000.  The NAIS modifies the CCIS in some 
crucial respects.  First, it provides for greater coverage in terms of farmers as non-
borrwowing farmers are allowed to purchase insurance.  Second, it provides greater 
coverage in terms of crops as well.  Insurance is now extended to commercial and 
horticultural crops. At present, sugarcane, potato, cotton, onion, chilies, turmeric, 
ginger, jute, tapioca, annual banana are covered.   Thirdly, it permits greater converge 
of the risk itself because it allows for a higher amount of maximum insurance.  Fourthly, 
the implementing state is required to reduce the unit area of insurance to the Gram 
Panchayat.  These four reforms are aimed to make crop insurance relevant for more 
farmers and in more circumstances.  Fifthly, to ensure financial viability, premiums are 
to be based on actuarial considerations and the small farmer subsidy is to be gradually 
phased out in 5 years.  Finally, to distribute the financial burden equitably, the financing 
of claims and premiums is to be equally divided between the central and state 
governments.  Table 5.9, from Parchure (2003), displays and compares the principal 
features of the NAIS with that of the CCIS.   
The NAIS, at present, is implemented by 19 States and 2 Union Territories.  Details 
of farmers, area covered, sum insured and insurance charges under NAIS during first 
five crop seasons (i.e. from Rabi 1999-2000 to kharif 2002) are summarized in Table 
5.10.   The ratio between premium to claims works out to 1 : 4.8.   Even excluding the 
drought year of 2002, the premiums to claim ratio is well above 1 at 3.4.  In terms of 
cost, the NAIS (on the basis of performance of five crop seasons) is better placed as 
compared to CCIS in terms of viability.  Under NAIS also, the maximum amount of 
indemnity claims (about 53%) have gone to State of Gujarat followed by Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.  Among the perils, drought has remained 
consistently the main cause for crop-loss.  About 770 crore of indemnities received by 
Gujarat alone in kharif 2000, are on account of drought.  Crop-wise analysis of claims 
paid shows that highest amount of claims have gone to groundnut crop (45%) followed 
by (14%).   
While the NAIS is an improvement over the CCIS in terms of coverage and 
financial viability, concerns remain on both counts.  While the NAIS covers food, oilseeds 
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orange, mango etc. are not covered.  Some states like Himachal Pradesh, J & K, Andhra 
Pradesh, Maharashtra where these crops are important wish that these crops be covered 
as well.  But reliable yield data of perennial crops is hard to obtain.  Regarding financial 
viability, there are still large gaps between the existing premium rates and actuarial 
rates.  A case in point is groundnut in Gujarat where the actuarial rate for groundnut 
works out to more than 25% when the premium charged is 3.5% only.   
  There are also concerns with respect to the administrative complexity of 
administering this scheme.  While the implementing states are required to educe the 
insurance unit to the level of Gram Panchayat (GP) in a period of three years, resources 
to conduct the requisite number of crop cutting experiments per unit area of insurance 
are not forthcoming.  Another issue is the use of short time series in calculating yield 
guarantees.  Currently, guaranteed yield is calculated on the basis of a moving average 
of 3 to 5 years.  As  a result, in areas, prone to regular calamities, guaranteed yield 
comes down drastically after a drought.  This has led to arguments that yield data of 
longer duration need to be considered for the calculation of guaranteed/threshold yield.  
Similarly, for many insurable crops, level of indemnity comes down to 60% due to 
repeated calamities in the past.  Some crops have reached a stage where only a major 
calamity would entitle claims due to the very low level of guaranteed yields at 60% 
indemnity level.   
 
5.11 Impact of Crop Insurance on Farmers 
The NAIS covers about 12% of farmers and about 10% of area.  So at present, crop 
insurance is not a risk management tool for most farmers.  Yet, even at the current 
levels of coverage, the government has lost more than Rs. 3000 crores in the two and 
half years (and six seasons) since the NAIS was launched in Rabi, 1999.   As the kharif 
season accounts for the bulk of crop insurance, most of the losses have incurred in 
kharif.  Of the 3 kharif seasons (2000, 2001, 2002) for which the NAIS has been in 
operation, indemnities paid out were smallest in 2001.  But even in this year, the claims 
were twice the premium income.  Expanding the coverage of crop insurance would 
therefore increase government costs considerably.  Unless the programme is 
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and impact more farmers is remote. 
  On the demand side, most of the farmers who take up crop insurance are the 
loanee farmers even though participation in the NAIS is now open to all farmers.  This 
suggests that non-loanee farmers are either not aware of crop insurance or do not 
reckon the benefits of crop insurance to be great enough to justify their participation.  
As Dandekar (1976) pointed out, the benefits of area insurance is the greatest when the 
yields of all farmers in the area responds similarly to production risks.  This in turn 
depends on whether the area that has been selected correctly reflects homogenous 
growing conditions.  Walker, Singh and Asokan (1986) note that this condition is most 
likely to be satisfied in dryland farming where most farmers face the same dominant risk 
of inadequate rainfall.   However, they also contend that such conditions also lead to 
area variability as farmers decide on sowing and cropping patterns after initial 
information on rainfall.  Through simulations the authors show that area insurance does 
not reduce producer risk significantly and area variability is the major reason why 
insurance does not succeed.  They are therefore pessimistic about the value of area 
crop insurance in dryland farming even though the potential for risk reduction benefits is 
enormous.   
  This conclusion of Walker, Singh and Asokan can, however, be challenged 
because their simulations assume farmers are restricted to buying insurance 
proportional to their sown area.  This together with their assumption of a low level of 
coverage (upto 75% of normal yield) explain the modest impact of crop insurance in 
their analysis.  In his pioneering analysis, Dandekar (1976) pointed out that with area 
insurance it is unnecessary to restrict the amounts of insurance either in terms of area 
sown or in terms of benchmark yields.  Instead, as long as premiums are actuarially fair, 
they should be freely chosen by the farmer (or indeed by anybody including nonfarmers 
since it is not necessary to grow the crop to buy area insurance).
21  In practical terms, 
however, as premiums are nowhere close to covering their actuarial cost, it is necessary 
to restrict the amount of insurance – whether by tying to area sown or by reducing 
coverage.  In such cases, the risk benefits from area insurance will be small as predicted 
by Walker, Singh and Asokan.  However, a definitive analysis is still awaited because 
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welfare.     
 
5.12  Suicides by Farmers  
In recent years, suicides by farmers have come to public attention.  Failure of 
technology and fall in prices have been blamed in the media for the suicides.  Although 
the act of suicide is an intensely personal decision that is not always explicable on the 
basis of known facts and circumstances, it is still important to know whether it was 
farming risks that drove some growers to this extreme act.  As Deshpande (2002) notes, 
the causes of distress are many such as crop loss,  (because of drought, poor quality of 
inputs, or pests and diseases) and revenue loss because of crash in market prices.  
Deshpande also notes that traditional institutional arrangements for coping with risk 
have declined leaving farmers to face risks on their own.   
  In an analysis of farmers’ suicides in Karnataka, Deshpande found that about a 
quarter were due to family discord and not directly attributable to agriculture.  About 
17% of the cases were associated with crop failure while another 6% of cases were 
associated with high debt and commodity price crashes.  In terms of cropping pattern, 
the author found that the farmers who committed suicides were more market oriented 
in terms of choice of crops than the “control” group that was chosen from the same 
village and with social and economic characteristics similar to the suicide victim.  Cash 
crops are subject to greater price variability.  Also as they are intensive in purchased 
inputs, their net returns also tend to be riskier than for food crops.  The absence of 
credit forces farmers to depend on input dealers for credit.  However, this also ties the 
farmer to  poor quality inputs supplied by the input dealer.  Deshpande found that the 
suicide victims were more dependent on moneylenders than the control group indicating 
their relative access to formal credit.  The failure of extension system to advise farmers 
about new technology and their use, limited access to formal credit, low quality of 
pesticides and other inputs and crash in market prices are some of the risk factors that 
are highlighted in Deshpande’s analysis.   
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This chapter has reviewed the principal developments in the agricultural economy that 
have affected agricultural production risks.  In the farmer’s fields, the most important 
change has been in the spread and adoption of technologies and inputs associated with 
improved varieties.  There is little conclusive evidence to suggest that these have 
increased the riskiness of production.  On the other hand, if neglected, the adoption of 
these technologies carry some long-term risks in terms of soil depletion and genetic 
uniformity.  On the policy front, the government addresses production risks through 
crop insurance programs.   While recent policy changes have enhanced the relevance of 
crop insurance as a risk management device, the program is still small in relation to its 
potential.  Further, the program is not yet on a sound actuarial footing and requires 
considerable government subsidies.  This factor may well hamper its rapid expansion in 
the future.  In view of the resources committed to crop insurance, it is important to 
have research studies that would examine the effectiveness of crop insurance in 
managing risks for the farmer.   
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Table 5.1. Instability in crop production, all India 
(Standard deviation in annual output) 
Crop & crop groups  1950-65  1966-85  1968-85 
Rice 9.99  13.92  14.27 
Wheat  11.52 11.15 11.44 
Course Cereals  8.01  13.20  13.35 
Cereals 7.83  10.81  11.10 
Pulses  12.00 16.26 16.07 
Kharif food grains  -  -  13.88 
Rabi food grains  -  -  9.83 
Total food grains  8.10  11.14  11.43 
Oilseeds 9.30  16.92  17.36 
All  crops  6.27 9.19 9.40 
 
Source:  Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988) 
 
Table 5.2.  State wise instability in food grains production 
(Standard deviation in annual food grains production growth rates) 
          State  1961-70  1971-85  1961-85 
Andhra Pradesh  14.8  13.6  14.0 
Assam 10.5  11.3  11.0 
Bihar 31.3  17.0  23.4 
Gujarat 25.1  35.7  32.2 
Haryana 25.6  15.0  19.7 
Himachal Pradesh  16.7  11.8  14.3 
Jammu Kashmir  18.0  10.0  14.2 
Karnataka 12.2  22.4  19.3 
Kerala 10.2  4.9  7.4 
Madhya Pradesh  21.7  21.6  21.6 
Maharashtra 16.4  27.4  23.9 
Orissa 14.5  26.0  22.8 
Punjab 13.4  4.5  9.1 
Rajastan 28.8  29.6  29.4 
Tamil Nadu  8.6  24.2  19.2 
Uttar Pradesh  15.9  15.8  15.8 
West Bengal  11.6  16.8  15.1 
 
 




  103 Table 5.3. Sensitivity of output to rainfall variations 
 
Percentage deviation in output due 
to 1% deviation in rainfall from its 
normal level 
Crop & crop groups 
1950-65 1966-85 1968-85 
Rice  0.4657 0.6650 0.6437 
Wheat  0.0980 0.1613 0.0279 
Course  Cereals  0.0407 0.5746 0.5907 
Cereals  0.1747 0.5256 0.4431 
Pulses  0.2350 0.5172 0.6093 
Kharif food grains  -  -  0.7613 
Rabi food grains  -  -  0.1130 
Total food grains  0.1939  0.5240  0.4643 
Oilseeds  0.1912 0.3910 0.3539 
All  crops  0.1651 0.4052 0.3794 
 
Source:  Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988) 
 
 
Table 5.4.  Stability in cropped areas & yields in pre and post green revolution 
periods  
(standard deviation in annual growth rates) 
Area Yield  Crops  & crop 
groups  1950-65  1966-85  1968-85 1950-65  1966-85 1968-85 
Rice 1.92  3.10  3.17  9.42  11.36  11.66 
Wheat  6.05  5.27 5.41 9.80 7.52 7.70 
Course Cereals  3.39  4.01  4.08  5.92  9.98  10.09 
Cereals  2.13  2.99 3.07 6.21 8.37 8.60 
Pulses 4.64  5.33  5.43  10.85  13.40  13.20 
Kharif food 
grains 
- -  3.70  -  -  10.73 
Rabi food 
grains 
-  - 3.94 -  - 7.58 
Total food 
grains 
2.43  3.25 3.33 6.37 8.56 8.78 
Oilseeds 4.79  4.93  5.04  9.01  13.16  13.51 
All  crops  1.85  3.19 3.28 5.34 6.54 6.68 
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Table 5.5.  Decomposition of instability in annual crop output growth rates 
during the pre & post-green revolution periods, all India 
 
1950-65 
Percent of variation in output 
growth rate (g.r) due to 
1966-85 
Percent of variation in output growth 
rate (g.r) due to 


















Rice 3.70  88.80  7.50  4.97  66.59  28.44 
Wheat 27.56  72.38  0.06  22.40  44.58  32.02 
Course Cereals  17.90  54.56  27.54  9.20  57.19  33.61 
Cereals 7.37  62.84  29.79  7.63  60.02  32.35 
Pulses 14.98  81.75  3.27  10.74  67.91  21.35 
Total food 
grains 
9.03 61.87 29.10  8.49  59.01  32.50 
Oilseeds 26.49  93.88  -20.37  8.50  60.50  31.00 
All crops  8.70  72,50  18.80  12.08  50.60  37.32 
 
Source:  Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988) 
 
 
  105 Table 5.6  Instability in irrigated & unirrigated farming (1971 to 1984) 





















8.7  9.2 14.9 5.8 13.2  16.1 8.6  8.4 13.6 5.5 16.4  18.8 
Bihar  5.9 18.5  22.6 6.2 14.4  19.4 5.8 18.0  22.0 6.0 13.9  17.9 
Gujarat  12.2 18.0 28.1 15.1 41.3 60.8 10.4 18.0 23.8 10.9 67.3 86.3 
Haryana  3.1  9.9  10.7 18.1 43.8
1 
59.0  2.2 9.2 9.3  18.0  38.5  54.8 
Karnataka 12.2 20.8 27.5 10.7  8.9  29.7 11.3 11.7 16.7 10.6 20.7 31.4 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
7.4 21.4  26.5 2.5 23.0  23.3 6.7 20.0
1 
24.5 3.1 22.5  23.0 
Maharash
tra 
11.2 29.6 41.6 10.9 26.9 43.5 10.8 11.9 17.9  9.8  28.8 43.8 
Punjab  2.6  4.5  5.4  14.1 13.0 18.2  1.7  4.2  4.9  13.6 12.1 19.3 
Rajasthan 10.6  9.4  11.4 10.8 42.8 50.7 10.2  9.4  11.3 10.5 39.7 46.9 
Tamil 
Nadu 
15.2 12.7 26.1 14.5 27.1 41.1 14.0  8.8  19.2 13.4 26.6 41.6 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
3.2 13.1  14.4 3.8 37.1  41.0 2.4 10.6  12.0 3.5 36.5  40.0 
Average
*  2.4 6.7 8.4 5.3  14.9  19.5  2.4 5.9 7.3 5.0  14.5  19.0 
*   Based on aggregate data of the eleven states 
** pertains to all crops, food grains & non-food grains 
 
Source:  Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988) 
 
Table 5.7.   Percent reduction in output in selected drought areas 
 
  Elasticity with respect to rain fall 
Total output  Food 
grains 





Drought    
year 
IRR  UIRR IRR UIRR  IRR UIRR IRR UIRR 
1972-73  (27)  7  20 8 18  0.3  0.7  0.3  0.7 
1974-75  (19)  7 13 10 14  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.7 
1979-80  (18)  10  20 6 22  0.6  1.1  0.3  1.2 
 
Note (1) figures in parentheses indicate percent deficiency in normal rainfall; 
         (2) IRR: Irrigated;   UIRR: Unirrigated 
         (3) These estimates are based on the combined position of the eleven states  
               listed in table 5.6 
Source:  Rao, Ray and Subbarao (1988) 
 
  106 Table 5.8:  Coverage under the Comprehensive Crop Area Insurance Scheme: 
1985-86 to 1999 
Total number of farmers covered  7,61,79,361 
Total area covered (Hectares)  12,75,13,668 
Total Sum Insured (Rs. Crores)  24922 
Total Insurance Charges (Rs. Crores)  403 
Total claim (Rs. Crores)  2303 
Claims ratio  1:5.72 
 
 
Table 5.9:  Major Features of the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme 
(NAIS) Compared to the Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) 
Features CCIS  NAIS 
Farmers Covered  Loanee Farmers   All Farmers 
Premium  2% for cereals & 
millets and 1% for 
Pulses and Oilseeds 
(a) Food Crops & Oilseeds 
Kharif: Bajra & Oilseeds: 3.5% or 
actuarial rate whichever is lower. 
Rabi:  Wheat: 1.5% of actuarial rate 
whichever is lower 
Other Crops: 2% or actuarial rate 
whichever is lower. 
(b) annual commercial/horticultural 
crops: actuarial rates 
Premium subsidy  50% subsidy for small 
and marginal farmers 
50% in the first year, but to be phased 
out in five years 
Limit of sum insured  Rs. 10,000 per annum  Upto the value of 150% of average yield.  
However, sum insured exceeding value 
of threshold yield shall attract premium 
at actuarial rate 
Sharing of Risk  2:1 by Central and 
State Government 
Food Crops & Oilseeds: Until complete 
transition is made to actuarial regime in 
a period of five years, all claims beyond 
100% of premium shall be borne by the 
GOI and States on 50:50 basis.  
Thereafter, all claims upto 150% of 
premium for a period of three years and 
200% of premium for an extended 
period of additional three years, 
thereafter shall be met by insurance 
authority.  Claims beyond the limits of 
insurance authority shall be paid out of 
Corpus fund for a period of three years. 
  107 Annual commercial/horticultural crops: 
Insurance authority shall bear claims 
upto 150% of premium in the first three 
years and 200% of premium thereafter 
subject to satisfactory claims experience,  
The claims beyond the limits of 
Insurance Authority shall be paid out of 
Corpus Fund. 
Participation by Farmers  Compulsory for Loanee 
Farmers 
Compulsory for Loanee farmers and 
Optional for non-loanee 
Participation by States  Voluntary  Available to all States/UTs 
Approach by the Scheme  Area approach  Area approach.  However, in case of 
localized calamities, individual 
assessment will be experimented in 
limited areas. 
Administrative Expenses  The GOI reimburses 
50% of expenses to 
GIC 
The GOI/States reimburses 100% 
expenses in the first year, which will be 
reduced on sun-set basis.  From 6
th year 
onwards, all expenses shall be borne by 
the implementing agency. 
 
Source:  Parchure (2003) 
 
Table 5.10:  Coverage, claims and premia under the National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme 


















6 7.8 356  5  8 
Kharif 2000  84  132  6903  207  1222 
Rabi 2000-
01 
21 31 1603  28  59 
Kharif 2001  86  128  7300  257  470 
Rabi 2001-
02 
21 32 1698  35 
64 
 
Kharif 2002  97  155  9425  327  1876 




  108 Chapter 6:  Market Risks, Government Interventions and Futures Markets 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, we review the principal developments that have impacted on market 
risks.  Government policy has played a big role in moderating price risks.  So the major 
part of this chapter concerns market interventions.  There are also private mechanisms 
that can potentially help farmers to cope with private risks.  In recent years, contract 
farming has become popular in certain cash and specialty crops.   A much older 
institution is the futures market that can provide insurance against price volatility.   
 
6.2  Price support programs 
In India, the origins of government intervention lie in the second world war when the 
government used its powers to promulgate orders on price control, movement and 
requisition of foodgrains.  In 1942, the Department of Food was established to 
administer these policies.  The principal issue was on the best means by which 
government should procure foodgrains.  The British government instituted a foodgrain 
policy committee to consider the question whether the government should purchase 
grain from the market in competition with private traders or whether it should have a 
monopoly of grain trade and obtain the supplies it needs?  The committee rejected 
either of these extremes and instead opted for a dual market consisting of a 
procurement machinery, fixation of procurement and levy price and a retail network of 
ration shops.  These elements of the foodgrain economy have survived till today.  A 
comprehensive history of government interventions in agricultural markets in India is 
beyond the scope of this study and the reader is referred to Chopra (1986).    Here in 
this section, we draw on the elements relevant to our purpose. 
  The initial intervention was motivated by the necessity to procure and supply 
foodgrains to the cities in times of overall shortage.  As shortages persisted after 
independence, the second world war interventions were continued.  However, till the 
mid 1960s, relative to commercial imports and food aid, domestic procurement was 
neither an important or reliable source of supply to the public distribution system.  Thus, 
the principal effect on domestic producers was a fall in output price because of foreign 
supplies.  For the same reason, output price variability was also bounded.   
  109   In 1965, the government formed the Food Corporation of India, which became 
the principal central agency responsible for purchase and storage of foodgrains.  The 
other important event was the formation of the Agricultural Prices Commission to advise 
on price policies for wheat, rice, jowar, bajra, maize, gram and other pulses, sugarcane, 
oilseeds, cotton and jute.  One of the objectives of the commission was the need to 
provide incentives to producers for technology adoption and maximise production.  To 
protect farmers from downside risk that comes about because of a fall in price, a 
distinction was made between procurement price and support price.  The procurement 
price is the price at which the government purchases grain.  As procurement is 
discretionary, not all farmers might receive the procurement price.  The support price is 
a floor price below which the market price is not allowed to fall.  This is made 
operational by the commitment of the government to purchase at the support price any 
amount of grain that is offered to it.  Table 6.1 displays the crops for which minimum 
support price is fixed by the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices or CACP (which 
was earlier called the Agricultural Prices Commission).
22  While FCI is the nodal agency 
for procuring cereals, the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation 
(NAFED) is similarly designed for oilseeds and pulses.   
  The price support system considerably reduced the market risks of foodgrains 
producers especially by reducing the phenomenon of distress sales.  Through 
procurement, storage and public distribution, government operations can augment 
supplies in times of shortfall (and thus reduce price) or subtract supplies in times of 
abundance (and thus increase price).  While there is no study that has quantified the 
reduction of market risks because of price supports, Ramaswami (2002) provides some 
evidence on the success of these policies in the case of foodgrains.  He finds that during 
the 20 years between 1972/73 and 1991/92, the government augmented supplies 
(because procurement was less than public distribution sales) in 9 years while it 
subtracted supplies (by procuring more than public distribution sales) in the remainder 
11 years.  As a result the average annual change in stock (which is the difference 
between procurement and public distribution sales) was negligible amounting to 0.43 
million tonnes.  Ramaswami argues that in a successful stabilization scheme, the 
average annual change in stocks is, over a long enough period, close to zero.  Thus, the 
  110 1972/73 – 1991/92 experience with price supports corresponds well to stabilization and 
risk reduction.   
  These trends have not continued as since 1991/92, the government has 
subtracted supplies in every year.  As a result in the 8 years from 1992/93 to 1999/00, 
the average annual change in stock was 7 million tonnes.  This indicates that price 
supports in this decade have not been merely stabilizing – but rather that they have 
consistently increased producer prices.  This has had a favourable effect on market risk 
for producers.  However, foodgrain producers face a long-term policy risk.  A policy that 
leads to stock accumulation every year is not financially sustainable.  When it breaks 
down, the stocks will come to the market and prices will crash.   
  For crops other than rice and wheat, there are few studies that systematically 
evaluate the effect of support prices on market risks.  Mundinamani and Mahajanashetti 
(2001) consider the impact of the market intervention of the Karnataka Co-operative 
Oilseeds Growers’ Federation (KOF) in Karnataka’s groundnut markets in Gadag, Bijapur, 
Hubli, Raichur, Challakere, Chitradurga and Davanagere.  The study period was 
bifurcated into the pre-market intervention period (1985-85 to 1989-90) and market 
intervention period (1990-91 to 1994-95).  As a measure of price variability, they use 
the range of the observed price (i.e., the difference between the observed maximum 
and minimum price) during each of the sub-periods.  This information is presented in 
Table 6.2 according to peak season, lean season and the overall period.  By this 
measure of variability, the table shows an unambiguous decline in price variability during 
the market intervention period.  The table also shows that the market intervention was 
more successful in stabilizing prices during the peak season because that was the period 
in which the KOF was active.  While the study throws light on the reduction in annual 
price variability, it unfortunately does not throw light on the extent to which the market 
intervention stabilized prices.  Furthermore, the study does not relate the price 
stabilization to its cost (incurred presumably in holding stocks across years).   
In the case of coarse cereals, price support programs have not been extensive 
and procurement has been falling (CACP, 2001).  The limited shelf-life of coarse cereals 
has discouraged price support operations although price supports could still be feasible 
at a local/regional level.  As regards non-cereals, there was no procurement of barley, 
gram or pulses in kharif 1999/2000 because market prices were higher than the MSP 
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Indeed, if the MSP is to function like a floor price then it should be operative only in 
times of excess production and not in every year.   
For 1999/2000, the CACP reports instances of commodities and markets where 
market prices were less than the MSP.  In these cases, the MSP has clearly been 
ineffective.  One reason for this is the limited presence of procuring agencies that often 
station themselves only in the major markets.  But sometimes, even in the major 
markets, price support operations are so limited that they fail to prop up the market 
price to the level of the MSP.  This for instance, was the case with soyabeans in 2000, 
when the MSP was higher than the market price in all the major producing states – 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, AP, Karnataka and UP (CACP, 2001).  Similar 
was the case with sunflower seed in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra.  The 
same problem, but for different reasons, was also seen with paddy in the eastern 
region.  As the governments in that region procure rice by the levy system, they have 
little incentive to support paddy prices although they matter more to the farmer (CACP, 
2001).  Another way in which price support turns out to be ineffective is when the MSP 
is announced well after sowing.  The CACP report of 2001 documents instances of this 
for the rabi  and kharif crops of 2000.  When this happen, the MSP cannot have an 
effect on production decisions of farmers.   
  The opposite problem: i.e., a market intervention that is more effective than 
desired is also seen in India.  This happens when the support price is fixed so high that 
the procuring agencies procure more supplies than they can sell (without severe 
discounting).   We have already seen an instance of this with foodgrains.
23  Among non-
foodgrains, the problem is most severe with cotton.  In 1999/00, the Maharashtra 
Cotton Growers Cooperative Marketing Federation (MCGCMF) offered producers in 
Maharashtra a price even higher than the central MSP.  As a result, the MCGCMF 
procured 32 lakh bales of cotton, sold only 7 lakh bales and accumulated the remainder 
as stock.  As the losses of such policies are not sustainable indefinitely, cotton growers 
face a policy risk as policy will have to find some way of getting rid of these stocks.   
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  In some cash crops especially vegetables, processors contract with growers to 
obtain supplies.  In most cases, the grower supplies tools, land, labour and management 
while the processor supplies the grower with seed, other inputs such as pesticides and 
extension service.  Usually, the contract specifies that the processor would buy all the 
produce at a pre-determined price. 
  From the point of view of the processor, this arrangement ensures raw material 
supplies (subject to production uncertainty).  From the point of view of the grower, such 
an arrangement provides an assured market and hence reliable income (again subject to 
production risks).  Cash crops such as vegetables are intensive in purchased inputs and 
subject to significant market risks.  Indeed, for some of the vegetables grown on 
contract there might not be even an assured local market (such as gherkins) as would 
happen when they are grown for an export market.  Without a contract, therefore, few 
growers would cultivate these crops with substantial market risks.   
  Contracting therefore provides a way in which producers transfer market risks to 
processors.  In return, the processors receive assured supplies at a cost that might be 
lower than if they organized production themselves.
24  In this exchange, both parties 
can in principle be better off.  However, whether this actually happens is an empirical 
issue.  Sukhpal Singh (2000) investigated contract farming in Punjab where growers 
contracted to grow tomatoes, chilies and potatoes with processors.  He found that 
farmers perceived the main benefits of contracting as better and reliable income, new 
and better farming skills, and better soil management.
25   
Dileep, Grover and Rai (2002) compared the returns from contract farming in 
tomato in Sirsa district of Haryana with that of non-contract tomato growers.  They 
found that while the total cultivation cost of contract growers was 30% higher than that 
of non-contract growers (because of higher cost of variable inputs), their gross returns 
were nearly double that of non-contract growers on account of substantially higher 
yields.  Net returns (over total cultivation cost plus transport cost) of contract farmers 
were 62% higher than that of non-contract farmers.  The gain to contract farmers would 
have been much higher but for the stiff transportation charges imposed by processors.  
The contract farmers faced zero price uncertainty while the coefficient of variation for 
prices received by noncontract farmers ranged from 6% to 27%.  Production risks were 
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seedlings supplied by the processor.   
 
6.4  Futures Markets 
Forward contracts where a seller (or buyer) agrees to deliver (or accept) a commodity in 
the future at an agreed price is a way for commodity market participants to do away 
with price uncertainty.  However, there are other risks in forward contracts.  One of the 
parties might default at the time when the transaction is to be realized.  Further, the 
forward contract is not easily tradable which the seller or buyer might desire if their 
circumstances change.  Neither of these risks are present in futures contracts traded on 
futures markets.  The clearing house in the futures market guarantees the contract and 
as the contracts are freely traded in the market, the market participants can exit from 
the contract at any point.  There is, however, a basis risk that arises whenever the 
relationship of the futures price to the spot price changes.  It is generally the case, 
however, that the basis (the difference between the current spot and futures price) is 
much more predictable than the spot commodity price.  So futures trading involves the 
exchange of commodity price risk for a much smaller basis risk.   
  Even in countries with well developed futures markets, very few producers 
directly participate in futures trading.  There are transactions costs of using this market 
and few producers have the trading skills to know when they should lock or lift a hedge.  
As a result, futures markets are usually used by commodity merchants and processors.  
For producers, the major gain from futures markets is that it provides a forecast of the 
future spot price.  Indeed, often the futures price is used to form the price in a forward 
contract between a producer and the local grain elevator (storage agent).   
  In India, futures trading is regulated by the Forward Contracts (Regulation) or FC 
(R) Act of 1952 .  Any forward contract of duration more than 11 days falls within the 
purview of futures regulation.  Within this class, the FC(R) Act distinguishes between 
forward and futures contracts.  Forward contracts are further divided into transferable 
and nontransferable contracts.  The FC(R) Act prohibits futures trading as well as 
forward contracts in all major cereals and pulses.  Table 6.3 lists the commodities (and 
exchanges) in which futures trading is active.  Recently, the government has permitted 
futures trading in sugar and some oilseeds like sesame seed and safflower seed.  K. G. 
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futures markets and the evolution of government policy.   
  According to Naik and Jain (2002), liquidity is a major problem in all futures 
markets except those of castor seed and pepper.  The lack of interest in futures trading 
has been ascribed to excessive government regulation and the functioning of exchanges 
(Sahadevan, 2002).  To gauge the effectiveness of futures markets in providing price 
insurance, Naik and Jain compared the basis risk with the spot price risk.  As discussed 
earlier, the basis risk should be less than the spot price risk if futures contracting is to be 
used as a risk management tool.  Naik and Jain found that except in the castor and 
pepper market, the basis risk was very high in the other markets.  For instance, in the 
December futures gur contract traded in Hapur, the basis risk was greater than spot 
price risk for most of the months of the sample period (1989-97) in which the contract 
was traded.  The authors also find that, except for the Mumbai castor seed market, 
futures markets in India are not efficient in price discovery either.  At the moment, 
therefore, futures contracting is not a useful risk management tool for producers.   
 
6.5  Conclusions 
  Price supports have been the principal means by which Indian farmers have 
received some protection against market risks.  The price support policy has its 
limitations as well.  Firstly, for crops other than rice and wheat, price support 
programmes have been limited or non-existent.  Secondly, for the principal crops that 
are supported, it has been difficult to balance consumer and producer interests.  In 
some of these crops, the support prices have been consistently fixed higher than the 
counter-factual market price.  As a result, and this is especially so in recent years, stocks 
have ballooned.  As these policies are not sustainable indefinitely, farmers face a policy 
risk depending on the way stocks are reduced.   
In specialty crops and vegetables, contract farming is gaining ground as a 
mechanism by which private processors obtain supplies from farmers.  These crops are 
characterized by substantial market risks and contracting allows the transfer of these 
market risks from the farmer to the processor.  It has been found that price stability is a 
major benefit of contract farming for producers.   
  115 Futures trading is a market based institution for trading price risks.  
Theoretically, it allows farmers to hedge against market risks.  However, transactions 
costs is a formidable barrier to the participation of farmers in futures markets.  Further, 
futures markets in India suffer from a lack of liquidity.  Their performance in insuring 
spot prices is also suspect because the basis risk from futures trading is high relative to 
spot price risk.  
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Rabi  Kharif  Kharif and Rabi  Others 
Wheat, Barley, Gram, 
Rapeseed/Mustard, 
Safflower 
Paddy, Jowar, Bajra, 
Maize, Ragi, Pulses 
Groundnut, Soyabean, 
Sunflower, Sesamum, 





Copra, Jute , 
Sugarcane 
 
Source:  Reports of the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (2001a & 2001b) 
 
Table 6.2.  Impact of market intervention operation on groundnut price in 
selected markets 
Range of seasonal indices of prices   Market 
Period Pre-MIO  period 
(1984-85 to 1989-90) 
Post-MIO period 
(1990-91 to 1994-95) 
Peak 19.66  10.86 
Lean 15.12  14.13 
1.Gadag 
Overall 25.78  13.97 
Peak 16.97  7.66 
Lean 15.78  9.67 
2.Bijapur 
Overall 16.97  14.20 
Peak 7.13  4.24 
Lean 21.81  12.60 
3.Hubli 
Overall 22.42  16.79 
Peak 17.63  9.14 
Lean 25.22  14.78 
4.Raichur 
Overall 17.22  14.78 
Peak 13.37  3.43 
Lean 35.08  19.09 
5.Challakere 
Overall 35.08  22.04 
Peak 15.93  15.94 
Lean 33.63  16.93 
6.Chitrdurga 
Overall 33.63  16.93 
Peak 6.35  4.73 
Lean 36.11  21.57 
7.Devanagere 
Overall 36.11  27.50 
 
Source:  Mundinamani and Mahajanashetti (2001) 
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India 
  
Commodity Futures  exchange  Year since futures contact 
is being traded 
Pepper (domestic & 
international) 
IPSTA, IPSTA-ICE  Domestic futures trading 
started in 1952,and by 
IPSTA in 1957; 
International trading 
started in November 1997 
Turmeric SOEL  1957 
Gur  VBCL, COC, BOOEL 
MACECL, ROOEL, (Gwalior) 
1982 
Potatoes COC  1985 
Castor seed  ACEL, BOAOEL, RSOBMAL  1985 
Hessian EIJAHEL  1992 
Sacking   1998 
Coffee CFEIL  1998 
Cotton (kapas)  EICAL, RSOBMAL  1999 
Castor oil-international  BCEL  1999 
Soyaseed, soyaoil and meal  SBT  December 1999 
RBD palmolein  BCEL  April 2000 
Rapeseed /mustard seed, its 
oil & cake 
KCEL December  2000 
Copra/coconut, its oil & cake  FCEI  October 2001 
Groundnut its oil oilcake  BCEL & RSOBMAL  November 2001 
Sunflower seed, its oil & 
oilcake 
BCEL November  2001 




ACE=The Ahmedabad Commodity Exchange   
BCEL=The Bombay Commodity Exchange, Mumbai (erstwhile The Bombay Oilseeds  & oils 
Exchange) 
BOOEL=Bhatinda Om & Oil Exchange, Bhatinda 
CFEIL= The Coffee Futures Exchange of India 
COC= The Chamber of Commerce, Hapur 
EICAL= The East India Cotton Association, Mumbai 
EIJAHEL= The East India jute & Hessian Exchange, Kolkata 
FCEI= First Commodity Exchange in India, Kerala 
IPSTA =Indian Pepper & Spice Trade Association, Kochi 
KCEL=Kanpur Commodity Exchange, Kanpur 
MACECL= The Meerut Agro Commodity Exchange Company, Meerut 
ROOEL= Rajdhani Oils & Oilseeds Exchange, Delhi 
RSOBMAL= The Rajkot Seed Oil & Bullion Merchants’ Association, Rajkot 
SBT= SOPA Board of Trade 
SOEL= Spices & Oilseeds Exchange, Sangli 
VBCL= The Vijay Beopar Chamber, Muzaffarnagar 
Exchanges mentioned in parentheses have been permitted to trade in respective commodities 
 
Source:  Naik and Jain (2002) 
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There is no typical risk environment that obtains for all Indian farmers as it varies by 
location, weather conditions, soil type, access to irrigation and by the particular 
commodity market.  Rainfall and drought risks dominate agriculture in arid and semi-arid 
tropics.  These risks are substantial and major.  As we saw, more than 50% of the arid 
and semi-arid areas are affected by drought once in four years.  The farming systems in 
these areas is shaped (in terms of cropping pattern, investments, land tenure, labour 
markets, the relation between crop and livestock agriculture and production flexibility) 
by the fact that farmers must constantly live with the prospect of weather-induced crop 
failure.  The choices that farmers make to ward off calamities – big and small -  often 
means turning away from profitable opportunities.  The trade-off is most acute for small 
farmers because their opportunities for ex-post management of risk through credit are 
limited.  When all other measures fail, farmers have no option but to sell their assets 
(principally livestock) or to migrate out to regions with better work opportunities.  Use of 
the first option is known to affect adversely their future livelihoods while distress 
migration is socially disruptive with the costs often borne by children.  Thus, coping with 
risk whether ex-ante or ex-post inflicts severe costs on poor farmers that often have 
such long-term consequences as to keep them mired in poverty.   
  At an aggregate level, irrigated agriculture is found to be more stable than 
unirrigated agriculture.  At the level of the farmer, irrigation not only substantially 
reduce the risks of moisture stress from uneven rainfall and dry spells but also enables 
the adoption of high-yielding varieties that thrive in conditions of assured moisture.  
Further, it extends the growing season and makes possible multiple crops.  New 
varieties and higher cropping intensity increase incomes that in turn substantially 
enhances the capacity of farmers to bear risk directly and indirectly (through credit 
markets).   
  The impact of improved varieties on production risks has been controversial.  It 
has been said that improved varieties do poorly, relative to traditional varieties, because 
of their greater vulnerability to moisture stress and pests.  Yet, the evidence does not 
support such a generalized statement.  Many improved varieties outperform traditional 
varieties under adverse conditions.  Furthermore, by increasing farmer incomes, new 
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however, arise from the success of new varieties.  Their widespread adoption leads to 
the possibility in the long-term of soil depletion and genetic uniformity. 
  To protect farmers against production risks, the Central Government together 
with the State governments offer a crop insurance scheme based on the `area 
approach’.  The scheme as yet covers a small minority of farmers.  Even so, concerns 
have already arisen about the cost of this scheme.  This is due to the fact that premiums 
are not yet in line with actuarial cost.  Such subsidisation makes it expensive to expand 
the crop insurance programme.   
  As farmers start producing for the market, price risks become important.  
Because of inelastic demand small increases in crop output can crash prices.  This is 
often the case with perishable products and with small remote markets.  As a result, 
except for a few wealthy farmers well connected to urban and international markets, 
high value crops are very risky.  The growth of processing and development of transport 
and market infrastructure can help in enlarging markets and enhancing the elasticity of 
demand.   
  In Indian markets, price oscillations (such as cobweb cycles) due to instability in 
expectations formation are often seen.  Commodities traded in world markets are also 
subject to such price variability.  The problem of matching supply to demand requires 
coordinated actions among producers.  Such coordination can arise from dissemination 
of market information and price discovery mechanisms.   
  Price supports have been effective in protecting rice and wheat farmers against 
market risks.  For other crops, central government interventions have been limited.   
For crops that are important to the regional economy, state governments have often 
stepped in to offer price supports (e.g., cotton, coconut, apples).  Price supports have 
been expensive and they have tended to accumulate stocks especially of low quality.  In 
some cases, farmers face a serious policy risk because of the immediate necessity to 
dispose of stocks.   
As yet, private mechanisms that offer insurance against price risks are limited.  
Futures markets have a long history in India.  However, crippling government 
regulations and extensive government intervention in the major commodities have 
limited the scope to minor commodities.  Recent policy changes are more permissive of 
  120 futures markets.  However, world over, farmers rarely participate directly in futures 
trading.  The principal benefits are indirect: from price discovery and lower risks in 
agricultural trade.  Contract farming has more direct impacts on farmers.  Market risks 
are large in specialty crops and vegetables that deters most farmers from investing in 
them.  Through price insurance, credit and technical inputs, contract farming could be 
an important mechanism by which small farmers can supply high value crops to urban 
and international markets.   
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  128 Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Estimates based on the Planning Commission poverty lines for urban and rural sectors 
of different states. 
2 The discussion of Barah and Binswanger’s work is substantially drawn from Walker and 
Ryan (1990).   In Walker and Ryan, the Barah and Binswanger paper is cited as a 
discussion paper circulated in ICRISAT and it is therefore unpublished.    
3 The figures can vary depending on the definition of arid and semi-arid regions.  For 
instance, Gadgil et.al (1988) report the contribution of arid and semi-arid regions to total 
cropped areas as 54%.  No matter what definition is used, more than 50% of the 
country’s cropped area is subject to significant moisture stress. 
4 Similarly, pest management practices in sorrounding farms can affect infestation in a 
particular field as it serves as a “refuge”. 
5 Linear demand and multiplicative production shocks are the assumptions used to 
derive the expression. 
6 We also deflated the jute price with respect to the paddy procurement price as paddy 
is a competing crop.  The results are virtually identical.   
7 Roy (1968) notes how long gestation lags in supply of about 4-6 years creates cobweb 
cycles in tea prices and supply.    
8 Much of the seasonal price uncertainty could be because of cobweb type expectations.   
For evidence on this in the context of the wheat market in India, see Ramaswami 
(2000).   
9 Binswanger et al [1985] 
10 Walker and Ryan [1990], Ravi [2002] 
11 Of course, when tenants are wealthy and seek high returns from entrepreneurship 
even if it is risky, then they would prefer fixed-rent leases to sharecropping.  Rao (1971) 
showed that farm lease contracts in West Godavari district were dominated by fixed rent 
in the case of tobacco but by sharecropping in the case of rice when in fact tobacco 
returns were far riskier than rice farming.  This was because tobacco tenants leased in 
land to earn profits while rice tenants were small farmers augmenting factor incomes 
through the fuller use of own resources.   
12 Walker and Ryan [1990] 
  129                                                                                                                                                  
13 Jacoby and Skoufias [1998]  
14 In Sanghavi, the data on all states in North India, except Uttar Pradesh, showed a 
higher annual income for male attached workers by a range of 15-100%.  Bardhan 
found that the average level of consumption for the family members of permanent 
workers in Bengal was Rs32/month whereas it was Rs24/month for family members of 
casual workers. 
15 Farmers who had wells were relatively wealthy and a difference in access to credit 
was not a factor in the decision.   
16 While covariate risks necessarily reduce the value of diversification, this strategy will 
not be effective even when risks are not covariate but they are such that risks across 
crops for individual farmers are strongly correlated.   
17 The practice of post-rainy season cropping carries a long-term cost, however.  It leads 
to increased soil erosion as bare lands are exposed during the rainy season (Gadgil 
et.al., 1988). 
18 For credit and insurance markets to work, creditors and insurers should be able to 
distinguish between high and low risks, ensure that the insurance or credit does not 
encourage high risk behaviour, and detect and verify the bad states which demand 
insurance payout.   
19 Ravi [2002, New York University]: Rural credit survey of 720 households across 21 
villages of Kannauj, Uttar Pradesh and Palakkad, Kerala. 
20 Ravi [2002, New York University]: Rural credit survey.  
21 Walker, Singh and Asokan are more positive about rainfall lotteries because it is not 
tied to area planted.  But as noted in the text, such a restriction is not necessary for 
area insurance as well.  Area insurance’s advantage over rainfall lotteries is that it would 
involve more basis risk because of the complicated relationship between rainfalls and 
yield variability.  After all, yields depend not just on the quantity of rain but also on its 
seasonal distribution and timeliness.  Rainfall insurance is probably simpler to administer 
and this is its sure advantage over area yield insurance. 
22 As the commission is an advisory body, the prices recommended by the commission 
are not binding on the government.  Generally, the departures from the commission’s 
recommendations have been in the upward direction – where the government 
announces a support price higher than the MSP recommended by the commission.   
  130                                                                                                                                                  
23 The problem also arises when quality specifications are relaxed.  An instance of this is 
in 2000, when quality specifications were relaxed to procure cyclone-damaged rice from 
Orissa.  While this provided some compensation for the cyclone-affected farmers of 
Orissa, the build up of low quality stock ultimately tells on the health of the procuring 
agency.   
24 In India, with restrictions on corporate ownership of agricultural land, processors have 
no choice but to employ contract farming.  However, even if processors could own land, 
vertical integration might not be superior to contract farming. 
25 Singh believes that these benefits will wear off in the long run as the dependence of 
farmers on processors will encourage them to use their superior bargaining clout to 
extract most of the surplus. 
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